arXiv:2607. 22926v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: High-impact generative AI makes catastrophic misuse a lifecycle-control problem, not merely a prompt-filtering problem.
arXiv:2607. 19449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited.
arXiv:2607. 13039v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for dual-use biology assistants often measure base-model capability, refusal behavior, or jailbreak success.
arXiv:2607. 07097v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety evaluations of multi-agent LLM systems often compare a direct prompt with a planner-executor pipeline and report the difference as a single "pipeline effect.
arXiv:2608. 12444v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An unconditional risk bound on automated decisions can be satisfied without automating anything, since a selector that never acts drives the bound to zero.
arXiv:2606. 04035v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present a systematic study of domain-dependent safety behavior in open-weight LLMs: 7 standardized experiments across 7 ethical domains, testing 5 models (12B--70B) in 4,200 interactions with dual-judge validation.
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
arXiv:2607. 12469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many agent-safety evaluation results are not yet load-bearing evidence: identical nominal outcomes (task success, attack success, monitor scores) may sit atop materially different evidence regimes.
arXiv:2607. 14890v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous coding agents increasingly execute multi-step software work, but lifecycle states such as reviewed, tested, DONE, and ready-to-merge remain claims unless supported by current evidence.
arXiv:2606. 10154v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests.
arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.
arXiv:2606. 05461v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety standards for ML-based autonomous driving specify the kind of evidence an assurance case must contain (directed cause-and-effect chains, quantified interventional effects, named root-cause variables), yet the XAI literature is organised by output type and technique family (saliency maps, feature attribution, counterfactuals, causal graphs, language traces).
arXiv:2606. 00448v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on community-contributed skills that expand an agent's operational capability set.