arXiv:2606. 08310v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as long-horizon agents with decision-making capacities.
arXiv:2608. 12373v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are increasingly used in strategic and advisory contexts, yet their safety alignment is typically evaluated in English only.
The paper titled "Position: AI Is Not Ready for Strategic Conflicts" argues that language‑model (LM) based open‑ended strategic wargames, while useful for simulating adversaries, institutions, and crisis response, pose significant safety risks. It identifies five failure modes—decision laundering, adjudication opacity, role collapse, escalation‑through‑adjudication, and failure of strategic imagination—and contends that such wargames should not inform real‑world planning or policy without an auditable safety case. Instead, the authors suggest using these simulations primarily as stress tests to expose potential failures in decision‑influencing LM agents.
arXiv:2509. 17192v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM-based social simulations can make a generated transcript look like a single behavioral signal, but the model behind that transcript may be doing several different jobs: choosing what an actor says or does, deciding what happens after an action, or both.
arXiv:2510. 10813v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation.
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.
arXiv:2606. 24391v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce Age of LLM, a turn-based 1v1 benchmark in which two LLMs face off on a 13x7 grid to destroy the enemy base.
arXiv:2509. 05367v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Model safety alignment predominantly operates on a binary assumption that requests are either safe or unsafe.
arXiv:2511. 04500v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as decision-making agents in high-stakes domains and as imitators of human behavior in the social and behavioral sciences.
arXiv:2504.00285v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are effective at deceiving when prompted to do so. Models that demonstrate better performance on reasoning tasks are a...
arXiv:2606. 31748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training on language models often induces over-refusal: improved safety on harmful prompts at the cost of increased refusal on harmless ones.
The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
arXiv:2607. 26120v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs)-powered multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed in mixed-motive environments, where agents operate under asymmetric information and strategic deception due to conflicting or hidden objectives.