arXiv:2606. 28061v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have increasingly moved from standalone text generation systems to agents that invoke external tools, access environments, and execute multi-step tasks.
By Shijing Hu, Liang Liu, Zhu Meng, Zhicheng Zhao
arXiv:2606. 00152v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users.
By Mingxuan Zhang, Jiahui Han, Dadi Guo, Songze Li, Guanchu Wang, Na Zou, Dongrui Liu, Xia Hu
arXiv:2510. 04465v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM agents require personal information for personalization in order to effectively act on users' behalf, but this raises privacy concerns that can discourage data sharing, limiting both the autonomy levels at which agents can operate and the effectiveness of personalization.
By Zhiping Zhang, Yi Evie Zhang, Freda Shi, Tianshi Li
The study investigates how users perceive the helpfulness and privacy-preservation of large language model (LLM) responses in privacy-sensitive scenarios. Using 94 participants and 90 PrivacyLens scenarios, researchers found that users’ evaluations of identical LLM outputs varied widely, whereas five proxy LLM judges showed high agreement but low correlation with user judgments. The results suggest that proxy LLMs cannot reliably estimate users’ diverse perceptions of utility and privacy, highlighting the need for more user-centered evaluation methods.
By Xiaoyuan Wu, Roshni Kaushik, Wenkai Li, Lujo Bauer, Koichi Onoue
arXiv:2609.14003v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Personal AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly given access to a user's private data and communications in order to provid...
By Minsun Shim, Ramisha Raida Karim, Ruthwik Jakkula, Kaiwen Zhou, Xin Liu, Xin Eric Wang, Zhou Li
The paper argues that privacy in personalized AI should be viewed as a system-level issue rather than just a model-level one. It identifies four interconnected privacy‑risk channels in personalized AI and proposes four system‑level requirements—interaction trajectories, internal information flows, indirect leakage, and the privacy‑utility trade‑off—for evaluating privacy. The authors call for these requirements to be systematically incorporated into privacy audits of personalized AI systems.
By Guillaume Salha-Galvan, Jiaying Xu
arXiv:2606. 26627v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf.
By Nada Lahjouji, Ashwin Gerard Colaco
arXiv:2601. 14660v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic Large Language Models (LLMs) are models able to reason, plan, and execute tools over unstructured data.
By Saswat Das, Ferdinando Fioretto
The paper introduces the concept of personalized privacy for large language models, allowing user‑specific disclosure preferences to guide information sharing. It presents P3Bench, a benchmark that extends contextual privacy policies with personalized rules, and shows that existing prompt‑based methods often ignore these policies. To improve compliance, the authors propose “Repair”, an inference‑time attention head intervention that aligns model responses with user‑specific privacy rules.
By Junseok Kim, Nakyeong Yang, Kyomin Jung
The paper introduces ASLEval, a framework for measuring privacy exposure displacement in large language model (LLM) agent sessions. It highlights that traditional local proxies—such as inspecting a single action or final response—often miss unauthorized data leaks elsewhere in a multi-step session. ASLEval pre-registers hidden target sets, tracks all declared visible exits, and preserves internal traces for diagnosis, revealing that a single outlet view can overlook nearly 47% of exposure and that internal evidence typically precedes visible leaks. The study underscores the need for benchmarks that define complete visible boundaries, ground claims in pre-specified targets, and report privacy alongside task utility.
By Guosen Wu, Huizhen Huang, Guoxiong Long, Tao Huang, Chen Hou
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can expose protected state through internal messages, tool arguments, logs, and persistent memory even when their public outputs appear innocuous. Existing privacy prompts, redaction methods, and source-level access controls restrict surface content or data access, but do not specify what a legitimately informed agent should disclose or how that disclosure may be reused downstream.
arXiv:2606. 10173v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI systems move into operating systems, privacy no longer turns only on whether a model runs locally.
By Jonghyun Chung, Sanket Badhe