The paper introduces a claim‑anchored execution contract that binds a tool‑using agent’s emitted claim to its exact source span, the ordered execution prefix that produced it, and the source version and access state observed. Each receipt contains deterministic anchors, source identifiers, offsets, hashes, quotes, and a domain‑separated execution commitment, allowing a verifier to reconstruct these bindings before semantic or task labels are joined. The contract defines seven independently testable properties and demonstrates high detection rates against cross‑object attacks, with strong performance on conflict‑aware support guard evaluations.
By Miaobo Hu, Shuhao Hu, Xiaobo Guo, Xin Wang, Bokun Wang, Yina Sa, Daren Zha, Jun Xiao
arXiv:2608. 16813v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agents now write knowledge graphs, but knowledge-graph stores still carry defaults set when humans curated them: accept writes now and clean later, keep one time axis or none, treat every writer's facts as equally trustworthy, and leave governance to dashboards and middleware.
By Steve Brown
arXiv:2606. 08590v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Kubernetes incidents are diagnosed reliably only when a root-cause system's reported gains come from incident evidence rather than scenario-specific shortcuts.
By Anastasiia Kuvshinova, Seungmin Jin
arXiv:2606. 10241v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history.
By Yohei Nakajima
ContractEval is a diagnostic framework that makes active obligations in procedural instructions explicit by representing them as query‑conditioned obligations. It matches these obligations against response or trace evidence, identifying omissions, wrong branches, ordering errors, extra actions, invariant breaches, and output‑contract violations as distinct conformance failures. In tests on audited procedural contracts, ContractEval detects and localizes all injected structural failures that output‑only and trace‑aware LLM judges miss, though it is not a compliance guarantee and remains calibration‑sensitive.
By Praphul Singh, Shanu Kumar, Akshat Agarwal, Ganesh Kumar
arXiv:2609.37603v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: A common safeguard for a data pipeline is redundant computation: derive each published number by two routes built on different technology and refuse...
By Fabio Rovai
The paper investigates how causal action verifiers, which guard language agents’ tool calls by checking identifiability against a committed action‑state graph, can be compromised through small graph misspecifications. By removing a single bidirected edge or reversing an arrowhead, the authors demonstrate that a verifier (CIVeX) that originally had zero false executions can suffer false execution rates up to 48.9%, with most of those executions being harmful and overall utility dropping dramatically. An additional attestation step that samples executions can detect these attacks with few false alarms, but it also leads to many wrongful rejections that reduce beneficial actions and incur significant experimental costs.
whyItMatters":"The study shows that even minor errors in the verifier’s underlying graph can drastically undermine safety and performance, highlighting the need for robust auditing mechanisms."
By Fabio Rovai
arXiv:2608. 16852v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Regulatory compliance monitoring in deployed language models is increasingly implemented as a legal and audit control, checking model outputs against written rules spanning data protection, healthcare, financial regulation, and platform policy.
By Saisab Sadhu, Aadit Sengupta, Vinay Kumar Sankarapu, Pratinav Seth
arXiv:2608. 02630v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Knowledge graph engineering often distributes accepted state, observations, constraints, processes, and hypothetical scenarios across artifacts whose combined execution contract remains external.
By Dongxu Yang, Ziyi Liang
arXiv:2607. 24563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Security Operations Centers increasingly rely on automated mapping of Cyber Threat Intelligence reports to MITRE ATT&CK, yet extractor outputs remain fallible and are often stored without the evidence, provenance, and validation history needed to decide whether an individual mapping should be trusted.
By Federico Valletta, Giacomo Longo, Enrico Russo, Alessio Merlo
arXiv:2609.38266v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Agentic large language models (LLMs) now move money through tools, yet the record of what they did is usually a trace their own process emits beside...
By Mustafa Arslan
Causal action verifiers gate an agent's state-changing tool calls by checking whether each proposed intervention is identifiable against a committed action-state graph, and they issue a certificate th...