The paper investigates how tool‑using language‑model agents can safely commit changes to infrastructure when external state may change between read and commit. By distinguishing invalidating races from predicate‑preserving and irrelevant ones, the authors evaluate three commit‑time guard granularities—global epoch, read‑set version, and semantic commit predicate—using a deterministic simulator and three quantized model families. The study finds that only the complete predicate guard consistently eliminates unsafe commits, while freshness‑based guards block a large proportion of benign races and model‑side signals fail to replace precise semantic enforcement.
By Zihao Zheng, Jiayu Long, Baichuan Li, Junyi Yao
arXiv:2605. 27784v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM agents are governed by long-lived prompt policies, where individually reasonable stand- ing rules can jointly govern the same pre- generation state.
By Lu Yan, Xuan Chen, Xiangyu Zhang
arXiv:2609.24165v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Synchrotron data reduction, detector calibration followed by azimuthal integration of terabyte-scale diffraction series, is a multi-step, expert-bound...
By Pawan K. Tripathi, Hemant Sharma, Andrew Chuang, Mathew J. Cherukara
Autonomous agents that author building information models need more than access to a host API. They need a representation of what they intended, what a compiler decided on their behalf, what was refus...
arXiv:2609.14578v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Autonomous agents that author building information models need more than access to a host API. They need a representation of what they intended, what a...
By Dmitry Kuklev
arXiv:2609.37603v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: A common safeguard for a data pipeline is redundant computation: derive each published number by two routes built on different technology and refuse...
By Fabio Rovai