arXiv:2604. 09523v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Training reinforcement-learning agents for cyber defense requires an environment that reflects the operational setting: noisy, partial observations, several defenders coordinating across a network, and an adaptive adversary realized through self-play.
arXiv:2608. 04317v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous cyber defense systems based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have attracted significant research attention, yet remain evaluated almost exclusively against static, heuristic red agents, leaving their robustness against adaptive threats critically understudied.
Autonomous cyber defense systems based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have attracted significant research attention, yet remain evaluated almost exclusively against static, heuristic red agents, leaving their robustness against adaptive threats critically understudied. Meanwhile, recent advances in Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) have improved LLM reasoning, but their integration into cybersecurity remains elusive due to the absence of suitable benchmark environments and interaction datasets.
arXiv:2603. 19864v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Penetration testing, the practice of simulating cyberattacks to identify vulnerabilities, is a complex sequential decision-making task that is inherently partially observable and features large action spaces.
arXiv:2610.00590v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An autonomous cyber defender trained with reinforcement learning (RL) is typically tied to the network on which it was trained, limiting its ability...
arXiv:2607. 28826v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous Cyber Operations (ACO) are increasingly important for defending enterprise networks as cyber threats continue to evolve in sophistication.
The paper investigates how reinforcement learning agents trained in one cyber simulation can be transferred to other simulators or real environments. It introduces a framework that decouples state alignment from action translation, allowing zero‑shot policy transfer without retraining. Experiments across four cyber platforms show that transferred policies can preserve performance in closely aligned settings and achieve substantial win rates in more divergent environments.
arXiv:2608.00677v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents operate in persistent environments where early state changes can influence decisions far into the future. Unlike conventional language-mo...
arXiv:2606. 08168v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Leading commercial endpoint detection and response (EDR) products have shifted from operator-configured rule sets to multi-component systems where autonomous AI components operate alongside, and increasingly in place of, operator-deployed policies.
arXiv:2608. 15012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a growing asymmetry in cybersecurity, where attack accelerates toward autonomous execution while defense remains predominantly human-intensive.
arXiv:2605. 26195v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are increasingly used for cybersecurity tasks, but most existing systems rely on fixed, human-designed scaffolds that struggle to adapt across diverse targets and failure modes.
arXiv:2607. 26998v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents automate penetration testing through an observation-action loop, selecting actions based on observations returned by tools.
arXiv:2608. 15016v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Network incident response remains slow and labor-intensive as the defender must infer multi-stage attacks from partial observations and translate recovery decisions into reliable system commands.