Models That Know How Evaluations Are Designed Score Safer
arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
arXiv:2606. 07874v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs-as-judges are the only way to evaluate safety at scale.
arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
arXiv:2501. 14940v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values is essential for their safe deployment and widespread adoption.
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.
arXiv:2606. 03648v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adapting foundation large language models to a user's task or preferred style through fine-tuning can result in compromising the model's safety.
arXiv:2606. 08531v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evolving from simple text-based interaction systems into LLM agents that can maintain memory, use tools, access external environments, and execute tasks.
arXiv:2606. 08531v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evolving from simple text-based interaction systems into LLM agents that can maintain memory, use tools, access external environments, and execute tasks.
arXiv:2607. 01153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model has followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, resisted an embedded command, or misreported progress in an agentic task.
arXiv:2607. 17575v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We propose ARBITER, a novel LLM guardrail framework that introduces two key ideas: (i) dual-hypothesis reasoning, a reasoning method for LLM guardrails that explicitly considers both safe and unsafe interpretations of a prompt before making a safety decision, and (ii) multi-component supervised fine-tuning (MC-SFT), a structured training loss for reasoning-based guardrails that decomposes LLM outputs into logical components and weights them according to their importance.
arXiv:2606. 22737v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Before letting an agent operate over real context, can you prove it used the right evidence?
arXiv:2509. 13450v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce SteeringSafety, a benchmark for evaluating representation steering methods across nine safety perspectives spanning 18 datasets.
arXiv:2608. 17183v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Small Language Models (SLMs) are increasingly deployed in resource-constrained, privacy-sensitive settings, where safety and bias failures can cause security and societal risks.