The paper introduces a two‑dimensional construct validity framework for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as judges, defining invariance (S) and sensitivity (R) to construct‑preserving and construct‑changing edits. Experiments across seven judges and four domains reveal high invariance (average S = 0.945) but low sensitivity (average R = 0.319), with sensitivity varying by edit type. Audits of public label sets show that surface‑only predictors can reproduce a substantial portion of labels, underscoring that high agreement does not guarantee construct validity.
arXiv:2607. 08535v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An LLM-as-judge score can move even when the candidate responses stay fixed, simply because the evaluator has changed.
arXiv:2606. 05384v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-as-judge evaluation is widely used in benchmarking pipelines, where model outputs are compared and ranked using automated evaluators.
arXiv:2609.00088v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM judges, models that score another system's output, can be gamed by the systems they score. Recent work identifies one defence that works: the jud...
arXiv:2608.29517v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as essay graders in learning analytics, evaluated almost exclusively with agreement statistics. Educ...
The paper introduces the Wiggle Framework, a unified stress test for assessing epistemic stability in large language model (LLM) judges. It evaluates judge robustness across three dimensions—Mechanical Consistency, Single-turn Conviction, and Multi-turn Persistence—using 9 frontier models on 14 judging tasks related to safety, toxicity, AI writing detection, and political-response evaluation. Results show significant instability, with verdict flips ranging from 25–71% under static pushback and 62–91% when challenged by an adversarial LLM, and highlight that successful pressure often misaligns with ground truth.
arXiv:2606. 25487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade.
arXiv:2607. 18828v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Readiness stress-testing of medical AI has focused on closed-ended and multimodal benchmarks.
arXiv:2606. 05183v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Pass/fail safety evaluation reports whether a model refused.
Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade. The judge is rarely checked.
arXiv:2608. 12645v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM judges have become central infrastructure for model evaluations, online grading, and reward modeling.
arXiv:2607. 18086v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Background: LLM judges increasingly score whether clinical language models give overconfident answers under incomplete evidence, yet whether a measured "safety gain" reflects real behavior change or the judge's calibration is unresolved.
arXiv:2607. 13347v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-as-a-judge is widely used to provide feedback and selection signals in closedloop regeneration, but this use remains insufficiently validated.