The paper evaluates two training‑time data poisoning attacks—label flipping and backdoor poisoning—on MNIST and Fashion‑MNIST using Logistic Regression, Linear SVM, and Random Forest classifiers. Label flipping degrades performance most for Logistic Regression and Linear SVM, while Random Forest remains relatively stable. Backdoor poisoning achieves near‑perfect attack success rates across all models while largely preserving clean‑test accuracy, highlighting the stealthy nature of targeted backdoors.
arXiv:2509.06896v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Targeted data poisoning attacks manipulate model predictions on specific test samples by injecting malicious data into training. Yet existing evalu...
arXiv:2607. 05748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning.
The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning. In light of the observation that a model learns poisonous samples responsible for the backdoor easier than benign samples, these approaches either use a fixed threshold of the training loss for splitting or iteratively learn a reference model as an oracle for identifying benign samples.
arXiv:2507. 05113v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison training data to implant backdoor into the victim model.
Backdoor attacks compromise training data so that a model retains clean accuracy but predicts an attacker-chosen target on triggered inputs. At very low poisoning rates, only a few samples convey the trigger--target association, making poison-sample selection critical.
arXiv:2606. 12075v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) heavily utlize Machine Learning (ML) but ML models can be manipulated via adversarial attacks.
arXiv:2607. 05516v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied.
arXiv:2606. 03523v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Early attribution of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity can help defenders prioritise investigation, select countermeasures, and reduce the impact of an intrusion.
The paper introduces Checkerboard, a clean‑label backdoor attack that uses a closed‑form, data‑independent trigger design based on an input‑space Fisher‑separability objective and a ridge four‑neighbor local‑smoothness prior. This approach yields a pixel‑wise checkerboard trigger without requiring data access, surrogate model training, or iterative optimization, and it outperforms existing norm‑bounded clean‑label attacks across four benchmark datasets. On CIFAR‑10, poisoning 20 samples with a 10/255 perturbation achieves a 95.72% attack success rate, while on IN‑100 a 0.4% global poisoning rate yields over 83% ASR without harming clean accuracy, and the attack remains robust against state‑of‑the‑art defenses.
arXiv:2606. 16242v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Rapid Response (RR) framework, deployed in production systems, including Anthropic's ASL-3 safeguards, continuously improves jailbreak-detection classifiers.
arXiv:2607. 05516v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied.
SAGE is a defense against clean‑label data poisoning that relies on a very small set of verified examples—both clean and poisoned—rather than a large clean set. It trains a generic feature extractor on a separate dataset and then uses a non‑parametric, similarity‑weighted prediction to flag poisoned training examples. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that even a handful of verified poisoned examples give a substantial advantage, and that the distribution of verified clean examples across classes is more important than their sheer number.