arXiv:2607. 05748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning.
By Qi Zhao, Christian Wressnegger
arXiv:2511. 07210v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Clean-image backdoor attacks, which use only label manipulation in training datasets to compromise deep neural networks, pose a significant threat to security-critical applications.
By Binyan Xu, Fan Yang, Di Tang, Xilin Dai, Kehuan Zhang
The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning. In light of the observation that a model learns poisonous samples responsible for the backdoor easier than benign samples, these approaches either use a fixed threshold of the training loss for splitting or iteratively learn a reference model as an oracle for identifying benign samples.
arXiv:2606. 02947v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Supervised fine-tuning is the predominant approach for adapting autoregressive vision-language models to downstream tasks.
By Ivan Saboli\'c, Marin Or\v{s}i\'c, Josip \v{S}ari\'c, Sven Lon\v{c}ari\'c
arXiv:2509.06896v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Targeted data poisoning attacks manipulate model predictions on specific test samples by injecting malicious data into training. Yet existing evalu...
By William Xu, Chenyu Zhang, Yihan Wang, Matthew Y. R. Yang, Zuoqiu Liu, Yaoliang Yu, Gautam Kamath, Yiwei Lu
The paper investigates how dataset imbalance increases vulnerability to backdoor attacks and degrades existing defenses. It introduces Randomized Probability Perturbation (RPP), a black‑box framework that detects poisoned samples using only model output probabilities, providing provable detectability guarantees and a bound on false positives. Experiments on five benchmarks and multiple attacks show RPP outperforms state‑of‑the‑art defenses, especially under class imbalance.
By Miao Lin, Feng Yu, Rui Ning, Lusi Li, Jiawei Chen, Qian Lou, Mengxin Zheng, Chunsheng Xin, Hongyi Wu
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv:2610.27533v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Machine learning benchmarks act as guideposts for model development and spur the creation of training datasets intended to improve benchmark scores....
By Yixin Wu, Rachel Hong, Jamie Morgenstern, Tadayoshi Kohno
The paper introduces Checkerboard, a clean‑label backdoor attack that uses a closed‑form, data‑independent trigger design based on an input‑space Fisher‑separability objective and a ridge four‑neighbor local‑smoothness prior. This approach yields a pixel‑wise checkerboard trigger without requiring data access, surrogate model training, or iterative optimization, and it outperforms existing norm‑bounded clean‑label attacks across four benchmark datasets. On CIFAR‑10, poisoning 20 samples with a 10/255 perturbation achieves a 95.72% attack success rate, while on IN‑100 a 0.4% global poisoning rate yields over 83% ASR without harming clean accuracy, and the attack remains robust against state‑of‑the‑art defenses.
By Yi Yang, Jinyang Huang, Binbin Liu, Feng-Qi Cui, Xiaokang Zhou, Haiming Jin, Zhi Liu, Jie Zhang, Meng Li
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
arXiv:2607. 08011v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models have enabled powerful code completion systems that assist developers by predicting subsequent lines of code.
By Anjun Gao, Yueyang Quan, Zhuqing Liu, Minghong Fang
arXiv:2609.31558v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Contrastive Language--Image Pretraining (CLIP) has emerged as a dominant vision backbone due to its strong transferability and zero-shot capabilities....
By Ahmed Abdelnaby, Mohamed Elmahallawy