arXiv AI

HEAT: Faster Fully Homomorphic Inference via Approximations-Weights Co-Adaptation

HEAT introduces a fine‑tuning method that treats the number of iterations used to approximate nonlinearities in fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) as learnable parameters, allowing them to co‑adapt with model weights. By optimizing iteration counts per nonlinearity, HEAT reduces the required iterations, bootstraps, and overall latency for encrypted GPT‑2 decoding while improving decode agreement. The approach achieves a 3.1× reduction in iterations, a 1.6× reduction in bootstraps, and a 1.4× speed‑up in end‑to‑end latency without changing the model architecture or requiring retraining from scratch.

arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 19

Practical and Private Hybrid ML Inference with Fully Homomorphic Encryption

arXiv:2509.01253v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In contemporary cloud-based services, protecting users' sensitive data and ensuring the confidentiality of the server's model are critical. F...

By Sayan Biswas, Philippe Chartier, Akash Dhasade, Tom Jurien, David Kerriou, Anne-Marie Kerrmarec, Mohammed Lemou, Franklin Tranie, Martijn de Vos, Milos Vujasinovic
arXiv AI
6d ago

Pacifo: An Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption-based Lightweight ResNet for Trustworthy Machine Learning as a Service

Pacifo is a framework that adapts fine‑tuning strategies to efficiently run the ResNet20 model using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). It introduces a public‑private layer partitioning scheme and an efficient ReLU approximation, reducing private layers and costly FHE operations during inference. Compared to state‑of‑the‑art FHE implementations, Pacifo achieves a 3.7–21.7× speedup while preserving 95–99 % of the original plaintext model accuracy.

By Yang Li, Gang He, Ruichen Zhang, Guangyuan Liu, Yinqiu Liu
arXiv AI
Sep 21

HE-Guardrail: A Homomorphic Guardrail Against Jailbreak Attacks for Encrypted Large Language Model Inference

HE-Guardrail is a framework that applies homomorphic encryption to enforce guardrails against jailbreak attacks during encrypted large language model inference. It evaluates guardrail mechanisms—Llama Guard, JBShield, and GradSafe—directly on encrypted data, deciding whether to return the model’s response to the client. The approach preserves confidentiality while closely matching the decisions of plaintext guardrails, offering varied security-efficiency-utility trade‑offs.

By Byeongseo Min, Yongwoo Lee, Young-Sik Kim, Yongjune Kim
arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 8

HE-OFT: Privacy-Preserving One-Shot Federated Fine-Tuning under Homomorphic Encryption

HE‑OFT is a cryptographically secure one‑shot federated fine‑tuning protocol that protects privacy by exchanging only one encrypted contribution and never revealing the trained model. Each client fine‑tunes a low‑rank adapter and a classifier head on a frozen public backbone, keeps the adapter, and uploads an encrypted head displacement that the server combines using multiparty CKKS without decryption. On four text classification tasks and one vision task, HE‑OFT achieves 61–79 % accuracy, retaining 85–96 % of the accuracy of a disclosed model, while a test‑time query takes 443.1–1713.1 s on one core or 56.1–255.1 s on a GPU, with level restoration reducing traffic from 1.6 GiB to 13.5 MiB.

By Halil \.Ibrahim Kanpak, Sinem Sav, Alptekin K\"up\c{c}\"u
arXiv AI
Jun 26

TGHE: Template-based Graph Homomorphic Encryption for Privacy-Preserving GNN Inference in Edge-Cloud Systems

arXiv:2606. 26664v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing homomorphic encryption (HE)-based GNN systems adopt a graph-centric paradigm that couples per-query cost to global graph size, limiting evaluations to at most ~20k nodes and making them incompatible with dynamic, large-scale financial graphs.

By Ngoc Bao Anh Le, Thai T. Vu, John Le, Heath Cooper, Jun Shen
arXiv AI
Jun 18

Practical Anonymous Two-Party Gradient Boosting Decision Tree

arXiv:2605. 26903v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Structured data is well handled by gradient-boosted decision trees (GBDT), which are usually trained on vertically partitioned features across mutually distrustful parties.

By Chenyu Huang, Fan Zhang, Minxin Du, Sherman S. M. Chow, Huangxun Chen, Huaming Rao, Danqing Huang, Bo Qian, Peng Chen