Governance at the Boundary: How Agent Decomposition Degrades Policy Compliance
arXiv:2608. 16055v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing agent benchmarks ask whether the agent finished the task.
arXiv:2606. 07866v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Regulatory review of advanced nuclear reactor designs routinely spans more than three years and consumes hundreds of millions of dollars in combined regulator and applicant labor.
arXiv:2608. 16055v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing agent benchmarks ask whether the agent finished the task.
arXiv:2608. 19216v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI control research asks how to deploy models safely even when they may be misaligned, but many control protocols assume that the deployer can instrument the model and its surrounding pipeline.
READY or Not: Reliable Enterprise Agent Deployment introduces a framework for qualifying AI agents for enterprise workflows. It measures reliability and operating cost under various oversight policies, selects the minimum‑cost policy that meets a specified reliability target, and statistically qualifies it on held‑out cases. In a clinical audit study, READY revealed that two agents with nearly identical autonomous accuracy required markedly different levels of human review to achieve the same reliability target.
arXiv:2606. 02965v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all.
arXiv:2606. 12320v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise security was built to govern data boundaries: the protected surface was data at rest and in transit, and the controls -- access control, data-loss prevention, perimeter inspection -- governed crossings of that boundary.
arXiv:2606. 09751v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Foundation models are moving from response generation into operational roles.
arXiv:2606. 29073v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model Context Protocol (MCP)-style ecosystems give language-model applications a practical connection layer for tools, resources, prompts, and transports.
arXiv:2607. 07097v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety evaluations of multi-agent LLM systems often compare a direct prompt with a planner-executor pipeline and report the difference as a single "pipeline effect.
arXiv:2605. 17909v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As autonomous agentic systems scale across regulated critical infrastructures, the lack of mechanistic, hardware-rooted enforcement for high-frequency policy updates presents a fundamental safety gap.
arXiv:2607. 08028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise large language model (LLM) applications often begin as prototypes whose behavior is carried by prompts and retrieval context.
arXiv:2608. 11344v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Financial institutions are delegating consequential decisions to agentic AI systems that decompose goals, coordinate models and tools, and act with little oversight.
arXiv:2606. 20615v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents now act as first-class members of the software development lifecycle, but the instruments teams use to direct them enforce nothing: process encoded in prompts is flexible but unenforceable, while workflow formalisms are enforceable but do not model autonomous agents.