arXiv:2601.22118v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been on the rise in many domains, including numerous safety-critical applications. However, for complex systems in...
By Johann Maximilian Christensen, Elena Hoemann, Frank K\"oster, Sven Hallerbach
The paper proposes a structured method for assessing the representativeness of Operational Design Domains (ODDs) in AI/ML-based aviation systems, focusing on safety assurance. It outlines a process flow from ODD definition to quantitative evaluation, recommending Kullback–Leibler divergence and Cramér’s V over chi‑squared tests for large datasets. The approach is illustrated with AI-based collision avoidance simulations, demonstrating how statistical distribution comparisons can support safety‑by‑design engineering aligned with EASA guidance.
By Thomas Stefani, Johann Maximilian Christensen, Elena Hoemann, Frank K\"oster, Sven Hallerbach
arXiv:2609.13552v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Generative AI is increasingly being used informally in Air Traffic Management (ATM) for tasks such as flight plan generation, trajectory interpretation...
By Alexandre Barreto (George Mason University), Shou Matsumoto (George Mason University), Jorge Valverde-Rebaza (Tecnol\'ogico de Monterrey), Cleiton Ataide (DECEA: Department of Airspace Control), Paulo Costa (George Mason University)
arXiv:2606. 30935v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While neural network control policies are powerful, their deployment on safety critical systems depends on ensuring that they obey strict constraints.
By Long Kiu Chung, Shreyas Kousik
arXiv:2606. 04121v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present our ongoing work on the veriFIRE project: a collaboration between industry and academia, aimed at applying verification to increase the reliability of a real-world, safety-critical system.
By Idan Refaeli, Maya Swisa, Itay Buchnik, Alon Zada, Guy Amir, Elad Mandelbaum, Ziv Freund, Guy Katz
arXiv:2608. 04045v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) enables aircraft fleet operators to jointly train remaining-useful-life (RUL) models from engine sensor telemetry without sharing raw data.
By Chinmoy Mitra, Md. Mehedi Hasan Nipu, Mohammad Sakib Mahmood, Md. Rakibul Islam, M. F. Mridha
arXiv:2603. 22770v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs) in safety-critical edge environments necessitates robustness against hardware-induced bit-flip errors.
By Alan T. L. Bacellar, Sathvik Chemudupati, Shashank Nag, Allison Seigler, Priscila M. V. Lima, Felipe M. G. Fran\c{c}a, Lizy K. John
arXiv:2510. 23389v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The behaviour of neural network components must be proven correct before deployment in safety-critical systems.
By Edoardo Manino, Bruno Farias, Rafael S\'a Menezes, Fedor Shmarov, Lucas C. Cordeiro
arXiv:2608. 13118v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Verification of neural networks against relational specifications, such as global robustness, is crucial for safety-critical applications of cyber-physical systems (CPS), given their increasing adoption of AI components.
By Kota Fukuda, Zhenya Zhang, Guanqin Zhang, Jianjun Zhao
The paper proposes a structured method for verifying Operational Design Domain (ODD) coverage in safety‑critical AI systems, particularly for aviation. It combines parameter discretization, constraint‑based filtering, and criticality‑based dimension reduction to create a multi‑step verification process. Using simulation data from AI‑based mid‑air collision avoidance research, the authors demonstrate how this approach can meet EASA’s requirement for complete ODD coverage in high‑dimensional spaces.
By Thomas Stefani, Johann Maximilian Christensen, Elena Hoemann, Frank K\"oster, Sven Hallerbach
Verification of neural networks against relational specifications, such as global robustness, is crucial for safety-critical applications of cyber-physical systems (CPS), given their increasing adoption of AI components. Compared to simple trace properties (e.
Federated learning (FL) enables aircraft fleet operators to jointly train remaining-useful-life (RUL) models from engine sensor telemetry without sharing raw data. This study examines two complementary challenges: benign heterogeneity, where honest operators observe different operating conditions and fault modes, and adversarial heterogeneity, where compromised operators submit poisoned updates.