arXiv Computation and Language

Adaptive Steering and Remasking for Safe Generation in Diffusion Language Models

arXiv AI
Sep 28

Why Jailbreaks Succeed in Diffusion Language Models: An Energy Landscape Analysis

The paper proposes a framework that explains why jailbreak attacks succeed against diffusion-based large language models (dLLMs) by viewing safety alignment as shaping a denoising energy landscape. It identifies two attack strategies—obscuring the query’s safety disposition at initialization or forcing the denoising path across an energy barrier mid‑trajectory—and introduces three training‑free detection signals that monitor initial safety disposition and kinetic energy in complementary subspaces. Experiments on several dense and sparse dLLMs show that these signals complement each other, and any attack that evades detection also fails to produce harmful content.

By Thong Bach, Dung Nguyen, Thao Minh Le, Truyen Tran
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 2

Safety Targeted Embedding Exploit via Refinement

Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching. We show that this creates an epistemic gap in which models confidently generate harmful responses for inputs that fall outside the distribution of their safety training.

arXiv AI
Jun 4

MaskForge: Structure-Aware Adaptive Attacks for Jailbreaking Diffusion Large Language Models

arXiv:2606. 04027v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) generate text by iteratively denoising partially masked sequences under bidirectional context, exposing a safety surface distinct from autoregressive LLMs.

By Yingzi Ma, Zhengyue Zhao, Xiaogeng Liu, Minhui Xue, Yue Zhao, Chaowei Xiao
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 3

Backdooring Masked Diffusion Language Models

arXiv:2605. 19262v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Masked diffusion language models (MDLMs) are emerging as a compelling new paradigm for text generation, but their training-time security remains largely unexplored.

By Daniel Yiming Cao, Chengzhong Wang, Sheng-Yen Chou, Chengyu Huang, Pin-Yu Chen, Shengwei An
arXiv Machine Learning
6d ago

Refusal Is Not Robustness: Measuring Harmful Reachability in Autoregressive Language Models

The paper introduces Bounded Continuation Analysis (BCA), a method that models autoregressive language model generation as a stochastic process over token prefixes to compute the finite‑horizon probability of reaching a harmful continuation. BCA builds a bounded continuation tree, labels terminal continuations with a semantic harm evaluator, and uses exact probabilistic model checking to estimate harmful reachability. Unlike traditional attack success rate (ASR) metrics that only assess sampled outputs, BCA reveals hidden harmful paths that may coexist with safe responses, enabling more precise red‑team targeting across instruction‑tuned LLMs and JailbreakBench behaviors.

By Parv Kapoor, Teresa Fortes, Claudia Mamede, Rui Abreu, Jonathan Aldrich, Eunsuk Kang
arXiv Machine Learning
2d ago

Harmful Responses Are Jailbreak Templates: Transferring Autoregressive Jailbreaks to Diffusion Language Models

The paper introduces RMT-Jailbreak, a method that transfers autoregressive jailbreak attacks to diffusion large language models (dLLMs). By masking tokens in a harmful response generated by an autoregressive model, the approach creates a high‑mask‑ratio template that, when fed to a dLLM, prompts it to reconstruct the harmful content. Experiments show that this technique effectively transfers jailbreak attacks across different models, highlighting a new vulnerability in diffusion-based language models.

By Jinwei Gan, Zifeng Cheng, Zhiwei Jiang, Ran Sun, Shiping Ge, Qing Gu