arXiv:2606. 04778v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to interventions during inference that redirect generation toward harmful outputs.
By Kyungmin Park, Taesup Kim
Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching. We show that this creates an epistemic gap in which models confidently generate harmful responses for inputs that fall outside the distribution of their safety training.
arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
By Joshua Adrian Cahyono
arXiv:2609.36956v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Manipulating next-token probabilities during generation can bypass the safety alignment of large language models. Existing approaches, however, rely...
By Jesson Wang, Shawn Li, Wei Yang, Franck Dernoncourt, Ryan A. Rossi, Charith Peris, Yue Zhao
The paper introduces a posterior reweighting framework to explain and counter in-context learning jailbreaks in multimodal large language models. It models the model as switching between safe and harmful behavioral modes, interpreting prompt demonstrations as evidence that shifts the posterior. Using this view, the authors derive scaling laws for jailbreak effectiveness and propose a defense that injects benign counter‑evidence to suppress harmful drift while maintaining utility.
By Xu Zhang, Dev Mistry, Xiang Xu, Ren Wang
arXiv:2607. 21804v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Lossless acceleration schemes, such as speculative decoding, promise significant inference speedups by relying on dynamic token-level alignment between a draft and a target model.
By Run Wang, Chaoyi Zhou, Xi Liu, Yi Zhu, Amir Salarpour, Pedram MohajerAnsari, Zhi-Qi Cheng, Feng Luo, Siyu Huang, Mert D. Pes\'e
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
SpecGuard is an inference‑time backdoor detector that leverages speculative decoding—using a small draft model to propose tokens and a target model to verify them—without adding extra model computation. By monitoring the draft‑token acceptance rate, SpecGuard detects when a target model shifts toward attacker‑controlled behavior while the draft model does not, signaling a backdoor trigger. The method reliably identifies a range of backdoor types, including stealthy attacks that bypass input‑level filters, across multiple model families.
By Rui Wen, Ahmed Salem, Andrew Paverd, Mark Russinovich, Zheng Li
arXiv:2512. 14751v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications.
By Yixin Tan, Zhe Yu, Rui Wen, Jun Sakuma
Speculative Decoding (SD) accelerates large language model inference by allowing a lightweight draft model to propose tokens that are subsequently verified in parallel by a larger target model. Recent approaches introduce lossy verification schemes to further improve efficiency by relaxing strict distributional matching.
The paper examines lossy verification techniques used in speculative decoding for large language models, showing that many methods can be grouped into truncation-based and collaborative verification categories. It analyzes how these approaches alter the decoding distribution, revealing that truncation-based methods can significantly degrade performance due to distributional distortion, while collaborative methods depend more on overshoot suppression and supervision quality than on simple interpolation between draft and target models. A diagnostic evaluation framework is introduced to assess these failure modes across curated benchmarks.
By Tianyu Wang, Yuxuan Zhou, Heng Li, Wenbin Wang, Zikai Xiao, Chunrui Zheng, Junyuan Shang
arXiv:2608. 15594v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical safety threat to LLMs, as harmful objectives are decomposed across a sequence of apparently benign turns to bypass guardrails.
By Md Messal Monem Miah, Adrita Anika, Zhiyuan Yu, Ruihong Huang