arXiv Machine Learning By Jinwei Gan, Zifeng Cheng, Zhiwei Jiang, Ran Sun, Shiping Ge, Qing Gu

Harmful Responses Are Jailbreak Templates: Transferring Autoregressive Jailbreaks to Diffusion Language Models

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The paper introduces RMT-Jailbreak, a method that transfers autoregressive jailbreak attacks to diffusion large language models (dLLMs). By masking tokens in a harmful response generated by an autoregressive model, the approach creates a high‑mask‑ratio template that, when fed to a dLLM, prompts it to reconstruct the harmful content. Experiments show that this technique effectively transfers jailbreak attacks across different models, highlighting a new vulnerability in diffusion-based language models.

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