arXiv:2606. 07316v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Can a committee of LLM agents reach agreement that is certifiable at the level of meaning, not only at the level of a label?
By Haoran Xu, Lei Zhang, Iadh Ounis, Xianbin Wang
The paper argues that as AI systems increasingly generate code, the bottleneck has shifted to supervising these systems, revealing a vocabulary gap between cybernetic coordination (actions aligning with the world) and epistemic coordination (understanding that can be verified). It critiques current oversight that merely approves outputs, proposing instead that every consequential choice by an agent must include a retrievable condition explaining why it was made, enabling third‑party verification. The authors illustrate this with three delegation episodes, introduce a two‑part reconstruction test, and propose the ORRCF convention to embed such conditions in all recorded decisions.
By J\'er\'emie Lumbroso
arXiv:2607. 12650v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool access alone does not make LLM empirical reasoning governable: accepted outputs need not descend from attested evidence, and accepted deductions need not hold up under formal scrutiny.
By Junyu Ren
arXiv:2601. 14271v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Shared accountability records are often used by parties who may never agree about causation, responsibility, or normative interpretation.
By Denise M. Case
The paper "SoK: Formal Methods for Fact-Checking and Information Integrity" discusses how automated fact‑checking systems typically output a verdict but lack a detailed record—called a warrant—explaining the evidence and conditions behind that verdict. It proposes organizing the field by what is being formalised—claims, reasoning, checking systems, ecosystems, and regulatory obligations—rather than by pipeline stages, and surveys 121 works to identify gaps, notably the scarcity of formal methods applied to verifying the checking systems themselves. The authors highlight that existing formal tools, though largely unused in this domain, could address these gaps and outline open problems with suggested first steps.
By Nikolaos Kekatos, Theodoros Nestoridis, Charalampos Bratsas, Charalampos Dimoulas, Georgios Konstantinidis, Georgios Malogiannis, Michael Sirivianos, Andreas Veglis
arXiv:2607. 05397v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent systems increasingly execute rather than advise.
By James Rhodes, George Kang
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
arXiv:2609.26035v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Conversational agents often express answers in a uniformly confident register. We test whether expressed uncertainty, provenance-aware assertion, and e...
By Sebastian Cochinescu
The paper proposes a tiered, reusable identity assurance model that separates assurance state from capability gates, allowing participants to disclose only what is necessary for each act. It introduces a typed entity taxonomy, a two‑axis coordinate system for assertion scope and source, and a time‑indexed jurisdiction attribute, with reliance recorded in bitemporal snapshots. The design is evaluated against existing flat‑verification and per‑credential models, addressing cross‑border reuse and data‑erasure versus evidentiary retention concerns.
By Walter Kurz
The paper proposes a new method for evaluating AI accountability by analyzing the structural quality of a model’s defense for its decisions, using a four‑phase dialectical protocol based on Walton’s argumentation schemes and Govier’s criteria. Applied to nine large language models and 200 ambiguous moral-choice items, the study finds that models generally defend their reasoning well above the rubric minimum, though failures cluster on grounds and sufficiency and correlate with epistemic hedging. The protocol also reveals that models often present different argument schemes in justification than in reasoning, detects indefensible defenses, and highlights challenges in assessing retraction in AI alignment.
By Daan R. Henselmans, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Arno Libert
arXiv:2607. 01223v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When should an AI system's answer be trusted?
By Ben Slivinski, Michael Saldivar
arXiv:2601. 14295v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models increasingly function as artificial reasoners: they evaluate arguments, assign credibility, and express confidence.
By Michele Loi