arXiv Computation and Language By Chenhan Lyu, Kit Wislocki, Sarah Elizabeth Stoeckl, Maitreyi Sinha, Amir Rahmani

From Clinical Judgment to Checkable Rules: Clinician-Led Guardrails for Mental-Health Chatbots

Read the original on arXiv Computation and Language →

The paper presents a clinician‑led safety guardrail for mental‑health chatbots that replaces typical prompt‑engineering or Constitutional AI methods. Two clinicians design, finalize, and adjudicate a rule base of four safety checks, which is formally verified for internal consistency and applied to LLM outputs. The verification layer’s verdicts are recomputable from a named rule and sixteen facts, and it consistently avoids false crisis‑resource demands that a matched LLM judge frequently raises.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Computation and Language.

arXiv AI
Aug 3

Reasoning in Real World Clinical Care: Why Large Language Models Are Not Yet Safe for Autonomous Clinical Decision Support

arXiv:2607. 28677v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM now pass medical licensing examinations and, in curated cases, can rival physicians at diagnostic reasoning.

By Shayndhan Sivanathan, Shravan Nageswaran, Mehdi Zadem, Ryaan Sultan, Nicolas von Mallinckrodt, Max Solovyev, Alexey Matyushkin, Sumon Sadhu, Gabriele C DeLuca, Sanjeeva Jeyaretna, James Hillis, Manoj Ramachandran, Prakash Jayakumar
arXiv AI
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Adversarial Pragmatics for AI Safety Evaluation: A Diagnostic Framework and Seed Benchmark for Language-Mediated Control

arXiv:2607. 01153v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, or misreported progress in an agentic task.

By Brett Reynolds
arXiv AI
Sep 10

Style Over Substance: Content-Invariant Wrappers Flip LLM Safety-Judge Verdicts

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By Yongxi Zhou, Wenbo Ye, Yuanzhe Liu, Zihan Dong, Junwei Yao