arXiv:2608. 04066v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: How do you verify a long-horizon agent when its own state and self-reports are exactly what you cannot trust?
By Mohsen Arjmandi
arXiv:2608.22347v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: A cognitive architecture is more than the module that reasons: it must also decide how long to think and what deserves the effort. We built a minimal b...
By Francisco M. Arrabal-Campos, Francisco G. Montoya, Alfredo Alcayde, Ignacio Fern\'andez
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
By Mark Russinovich
arXiv:2607. 06503v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents solving multi-step tasks frequently commit to trajectories that are doomed to fail, yet continue to consume substantial inference compute before the failure becomes observable.
By Kai Ruan, Zihe Huang, Ziqi Zhou, Qianshan Wei, Xuan Wang, Hao Sun
arXiv:2608. 05863v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern models no longer keep a plain KV cache: latent caches, learned sparse selectors and recurrent states each carry the model's memory in a different form, and each fails differently under compression.
By Fanzhe Wei, Li Liu, Ziyang Wang, Chenyu Wang
The paper investigates how tool‑using language‑model agents can safely commit changes to infrastructure when external state may change between read and commit. By distinguishing invalidating races from predicate‑preserving and irrelevant ones, the authors evaluate three commit‑time guard granularities—global epoch, read‑set version, and semantic commit predicate—using a deterministic simulator and three quantized model families. The study finds that only the complete predicate guard consistently eliminates unsafe commits, while freshness‑based guards block a large proportion of benign races and model‑side signals fail to replace precise semantic enforcement.
By Zihao Zheng, Jiayu Long, Baichuan Li, Junyi Yao