arXiv:2607. 02201v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid deployment of AI systems across high-stakes domains has created urgent demand for standardized evaluation, yet the field remains fragmented across competing risk taxonomies that catalog risks without showing how an audit is executed.
arXiv:2608. 07446v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in enterprise settings has introduced operational, security, and governance risks.
The paper introduces a deterministic AI security risk assessment framework that transforms diverse engineering artefacts into a standardized Control ID taxonomy scored on a four‑level ordinal scale. It compiles technique‑level predicates from a fixed MITRE ATLAS snapshot, linking each control to mitigation and producing traceable feasibility and impact outputs. The framework is formally verified for boundedness, totality, consistency, and monotonicity, and is evaluated on five open‑source AI projects, showing that strengthened controls lower feasibility scores while residual risks persist when core controls are missing.
arXiv:2608. 04921v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI systems become increasingly integrated into diverse interfaces and applications, model-centric audits are insufficient to address risks arising from interactions among system components and deployment environments.
arXiv:2607. 13081v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion.
arXiv:2609.21841v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier language models now produce professional deliverables that expert graders judge to match human work on a substantial share of economically val...
The paper introduces the Systemic Risk Index, an open pipeline and dashboard that aggregates evidence from 19 public AI benchmarks into four systemic‑risk categories defined by the EU GPAI Code of Practice. It evaluates 18 models using harm‑preserving perturbations and simulated deployment contexts, offering users the ability to switch between average and worst‑case aggregation and to trace each risk rating back to its benchmark evidence. The study finds that worst‑case scores can be 14 to 37 points lower than average scores, and that LLM judges agree with human graders at a level comparable to human‑human agreement.
The paper introduces a new taxonomy for benchmark contamination that categorizes leakage by the mitigation it defeats—direct, derivative, temporal, distributional, and acquired—covering both training‑time and evaluation‑time scenarios. It proposes a four‑field disclosure protocol to record contamination status alongside benchmark scores, and provides a JSON schema, validator, and examples. An empirical study of 41 documents using a pre‑registered instrument shows limited reporting of contamination types and variable reliability, highlighting gaps in current disclosure practices.
Claims about AI safety reach audiences well beyond the AI community, yet many rely on opaque evidence or static assessments, when supporting evidence is accessible at all. We present the Systemic Risk...
The paper introduces Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework that translates the EU AI Act’s technical requirements into 43 machine‑checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules. GaC runs within a CI/CD pipeline, producing Article‑indexed audit evidence and providing actual Rego policy code. The authors validate GaC on two enterprise deployments, showing it reproduces manual audit findings—including three penalty‑triggering violations—while reducing audit labor by about 75%.
arXiv:2609.22664v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Research on large language model agents for penetration testing is evaluated almost entirely by capability: whether the agent captures a flag or repr...
We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion. We first introduce the NSFA taxonomy, which organizes 185 risk variants into a CIA-triad-grounded hierarchy and is cross-validated against three well-established OWASP guidelines.
arXiv:2607. 09682v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems are increasingly used to assist consequential decisions in regulated domains such as auditing, finance, and healthcare.