The paper introduces the Systemic Risk Index, an open pipeline and dashboard that aggregates evidence from 19 public AI benchmarks into four systemic‑risk categories defined by the EU GPAI Code of Practice. It evaluates 18 models using harm‑preserving perturbations and simulated deployment contexts, offering users the ability to switch between average and worst‑case aggregation and to trace each risk rating back to its benchmark evidence. The study finds that worst‑case scores can be 14 to 37 points lower than average scores, and that LLM judges agree with human graders at a level comparable to human‑human agreement.
By Jacob T. Emmerson, Phuong-Anh Nguyen-Le, Ronan Romano, Wilber Sean V. Anterola, Yann Billeter, Zhijing Jin
arXiv:2608. 07446v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in enterprise settings has introduced operational, security, and governance risks.
By Afreen Alam, Evgenija Popchanovska, Ana Gjorgjevikj, Maryan Rizinski, Lubomir T. Chitkushev, Irena Vodenska, Dimitar Trajanov
The article discusses how automated red‑teaming can uncover more vulnerabilities at lower cost than human red‑teaming on AI safety benchmarks, yet this comparison conflates measurement with conclusion. It argues that benchmarks only assess harms within a predefined set, leaving a "threat‑model coverage gap" that can hide new risks, as seen in non‑English prompts. The authors suggest that evaluators from deployment contexts distinct from developers are needed to close this gap.
By Madhava Gaikwad
The paper introduces the AI Assessment Sandbox Configurator, an open‑source framework designed to support technical assessment in AI Regulatory Sandboxes (AIRS) mandated by the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. It outlines 11 architectural and governance requirements for infrastructure that enables large‑scale, structured technical testing, and presents a catalogue of tests, a shared data model, dashboards, and reporting tools that harmonise heterogeneous outputs. An early‑stage pilot demonstrated the framework’s harmonisation and reporting capabilities within a live AIRS engagement, contributing to an official Exit Report.
By Alessio Buscemi, German Castignani, Daniele Pagani, Maxime Cordy, Jordi Cabot
arXiv:2606. 09809v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI evaluation results are produced at scale but reported inconsistently across leaderboards, model cards, benchmark papers, and company blogs.
By Avijit Ghosh, Anka Reuel, Jenny Chim, Wm. Matthew Kennedy, Srishti Yadav, Jennifer Mickel, Yanan Long, Andrew Tran, Anastassia Kornilova, Damian Stachura, Kevin Klyman, Felix Friedrich, Jeba Sania, Max Lamparth, Jan Batzner, Anoop Mishra, Eliya Habba, Yixiong Hao, Nathan Heath, Shalaleh Rismani, Usman Gohar, Andrea Loehr, David Manheim, Ruchira Dhar, Sree Harsha Nelaturu, Aarush Sinha, Leshem Choshen, Drishti Sharma, Ishan Khire, Amit Saha, Subramanyam Sahoo, Michael Hardy, Michael Alexander Riegler, Kabir Manghnani, Michelle Lin, Yanan Jiang, Yilin Huang, Asaf Yehudai, Jessica Ji, Aris Hofmann, Mubashara Akhtar, Nuno Moniz, Yacine Jernite, Stella Biderman, Zeerak Talat, Sanmi Koyejo, Mykel Kochenderfer, Irene Solaiman
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
By Harry Owiredu-Ashley
arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
By Katharina Deckenbach, Haritz Puerto, Jonas Geiping, Sahar Abdelnabi
The paper introduces Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework that translates the EU AI Act’s technical requirements into 43 machine‑checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules. GaC runs within a CI/CD pipeline, producing Article‑indexed audit evidence and providing actual Rego policy code. The authors validate GaC on two enterprise deployments, showing it reproduces manual audit findings—including three penalty‑triggering violations—while reducing audit labor by about 75%.
By Rudrendu Kumar Paul, Sourav Nandy
arXiv:2607. 02197v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The society and emerging risk-based regulatory frameworks for AI underscore the need for rigorous risk assessment to ensure safe and reliable AI systems.
By Javier Irigoyen, Roberto Daza, Aythami Morales, Julian Fierrez, Ruben Tolosana, Ruben Vera-Rodriguez, Francisco Jurado, Alvaro Ortigosa
The paper introduces a black-box framework for evaluating agentic AI systems, focusing on multi-step vulnerabilities that standard single-turn tests miss. It presents a seven-domain taxonomy linking observable behaviors to risk categories, an automated SAGE-RT red-teaming process generating 120 adversarial scenarios per domain, and a human-validated evaluation using LLM judges. Empirical tests on CrewAI and AutoGen agents show significant governance, privacy, and behavior risks, demonstrating the framework’s ability to uncover critical architectural weaknesses without privileged access.
By Divyanshu Kumar, Nitin Aravind Birur, Tanay Baswa, Sahil Agarwal, Prashanth Harshangi
arXiv:2607. 16112v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier AI companies have published capability thresholds that differ substantially, making it difficult for third parties to verify whether a threshold has been crossed or to compare requirements across companies.
By Wilber Sean Anterola, Matthew Ball, Luis F. Lafuerza, Markov Grey
arXiv:2609.13642v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We argue that a recurring failure in the evaluation of deployed AI systems occurs when data collected for operational monitoring or regulatory complian...
By Hung-Yu Lin, Xingran Huang, Qiming Guo, Jinwen Tang