arXiv AI

Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in Next-Generation LLM Agent Systems: A Cross-Provider Empirical Extension

arXiv:2605. 29874v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Do next-generation LLM agents inherit the cooperative biases documented in their predecessors, or does scale and provider diversity reshape equilibrium behaviour in competitive multi-agent settings?

arXiv AI
2d ago

Reputation, Strategy, and Emotion Effects on Generative AI Cooperation: A Comparison Across Reasoning and Non-Reasoning Models

The study investigates how reputation, strategy, and emotional signals influence cooperation in generative AI models using the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Non‑reasoning models (Claude 3.5, Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT‑4o) showed cooperation shaped by all three factors, while reasoning models (Claude 4.6, Gemini 3, GPT‑5.2) relied more on strategy and reputation, displayed reduced emotional influence, and exhibited varied end‑game behaviors. These results highlight the growing sophistication and heterogeneity of AI social behavior, suggesting the need for standardized cooperation benchmarks.

By Celso de Melo, Zishan Feng, James Hale, Kazunori Terada, Giorgio Coricelli, Jonathan Gratch
arXiv AI
Jul 7

CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.

By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv AI
Jun 30

Whose Side Is Your Agent On? Multi-Party Principal Loyalty in LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 30383v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A rapidly growing class of LLM agents is multi-party: the agent acts for a principal (who briefs it, sends follow-ups, and receives results) while also conversing in a separate channel with a counterparty whose interests may diverge (negotiating with a vendor, screening inbound requests, or mediating between employees).

By Bojie Li, Noah Shi
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 2

Truthful AI Advisors: A Pre-Specified Benchmark for Large Language Model Honesty Under Preference Misalignment

arXiv:2606. 01456v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed as advisors whose objective is not aligned with the user's: recommenders optimize for engagement, sales assistants for purchases, negotiation agents for concessions.

By Hamidreza Hasani Balyani, Seyed Pouyan Mousavi Davoudi, Alireza Amiri-Margavi, Amin Gholami Davodi, Arshia Gharagozlou
arXiv AI
Aug 25

XTC: Head-Aware Sampling by Excluding Top Choices

XTC (Exclude Top Choices) is a lightweight, head‑aware decoding operator that improves diversity in autoregressive language models by removing overly probable tokens that dominate the next‑token distribution. It works by identifying tokens above a plausibility threshold, probabilistically excluding the dominant choices, and renormalizing the remaining distribution. Across 60 experiments on models such as Gemma 3 and DeepSeek R1, XTC boosts Distinct‑2 scores by 11–15 % and cuts repeat trigrams by 27–47 %, while a Mechanical Turk study shows a 62.3 % preference for XTC‑generated text without loss of fluency.

By Philipp Emanuel Weidmann, Allen Roush, Judah Goldfeder, Sanjay Basu, Ravid Shwartz-Ziv