arXiv AI

IndicBankBench: Evaluating Safety and Reliability of Language Model Assistants in Indian Retail Banking

IndicBankBench is a 799‑case benchmark designed to evaluate the safety and reliability of language model assistants in Indian retail banking. It covers five operational domains, a capability/refusal domain, and twenty primary axes, assessing each case at four stages: safety, action and tool use, response adequacy, and advisory quality. The benchmark uses deterministic safety checks, a narrow resolver for ambiguous confirmation‑before‑write scenarios, and an LLM judge for semantic response adequacy, reporting strict pass rates that reveal a gap between strict reliability (43.7%–58.2%) and at‑least‑once success (60%–74%).

arXiv AI
Aug 20

FraudBench: Stress-Testing Policy-Grounded Banking Agents Against Adaptive Fraud

FraudBench is a new benchmark that tests policy‑grounded banking conversational agents against adaptive fraud scenarios. It uses a dual‑control framework and a 698‑document internal policy corpus, presenting 150 adversarial scenarios (107 public, 43 held‑out) that require agents to manage mutable account state and tool access while preventing identity, authorization, and trust manipulation. Preliminary results on four agents show attack‑security rates between 49% and 65%, highlighting weaknesses in money‑mule and first‑party fraud detection.

By Dheeraj Mohandas Pai, Lu Xian
arXiv AI
Sep 2

Validity-Aware Jailbreak Evaluation for Large Language Models

The paper introduces SEAV, a verification‑centric framework for evaluating jailbreak attempts against large language models. SEAV decomposes responses into ordered steps and checks both validity and correctness using LLM‑as‑a‑judge and retrieval‑grounded verification. The method reduces false positives by 14.9 percentage points on a strategic‑dishonesty diagnostic and reclassifies 22.1–51.0% of previously successful jailbreaks as invalid across multiple benchmarks.

By Qilong Wu, Sahil Wadhwa, Pranab Mohanty, Giri Iyengar, Varun Chandrasekaran
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 25

RAS: Measuring LLM Safety Through Refusal Alignment

arXiv:2606. 25750v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy.

By Chang-Chieh Huang, Yan-Lun Chen, Chia-Mu Yu, Wei-Bin Lee
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 27

FinRiskAtlas: Decision-Aligned Evaluation of Large Language Models for Financial Risk Review

FinRiskAtlas is a Chinese-language benchmark designed to evaluate large language models (LLMs) for financial risk review by focusing on decision‑aligned tasks rather than generic financial knowledge. It contains 9,742 instances across 53 task families, including 42 domain‑knowledge families and 11 downstream review operations defined by explicit evaluation contracts. The extended FinRisk‑Ask framework replays 680 pre‑action states from 104 professional trajectories, withholding future evidence during inference to assess evidence‑state control and request targeting. Results across 33 model configurations show that operation‑level evaluation yields distinct rankings and that knowledge‑based shortlisting can incur significant regret, while frequent use of the Ask branch does not necessarily improve evidence acquisition, highlighting gaps in broad financial capability scores.

By Suyang Zhong, Jingzhe Zhu, Qi Xu, Liyao Sun, Yin Wang, Qingqing Sun, Shuai Chen, Tianyi Zhang
arXiv AI
Sep 18

From Intent to Action: Benchmarking LLM Safety in Vehicle Voice Command Authorization

The paper introduces a 202-scenario benchmark to evaluate how large language models (LLMs) handle safety-critical authorization decisions for vehicle voice commands. It tests two local open-weight models and three API-based LLMs, finding alignment scores ranging from 40.1% to 89.1% and noting persistent false execution errors. The study concludes that structured LLM decisions alone are insufficient for safety, recommending an independent enforcement layer to verify tool permissions and vehicle-state constraints before any vehicle function is invoked.

By Diba Afroze, Xingli Zhang, Yazhou Tu, Xiali Hei