arXiv:2606. 02965v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As large language models gain tool access and are deployed as autonomous agents capable of editing records, executing transactions, and modifying infrastructure, we still evaluate them based on the sole metric of task completion.
By Victor Ojewale, Suresh Venkatasubramanian
arXiv:2608. 02645v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents rely on external tools to perform multistage tasks.
By Isham Kalappurackal Mansoor, Abhishek Phadke, Pratip Rana
arXiv:2605. 10555v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As AI agents transition from research prototypes to enterprise production systems, the tool interfaces they consume remain rooted in human-oriented CRUD paradigms.
By Kai Pan, Rong Hou
ToolRobustBench is a stage-wise diagnostic benchmark designed to evaluate and diagnose failures in tool‑calling agents, which are large language models that select tools, provide structured arguments, and interpret tool feedback. The benchmark aligns four perturbation families—tool‑interface, user‑intent, tool‑output/observation, and runtime‑environment—with the tool‑use pipeline, attributing failures to specific stages such as tool selection, schema grounding, argument binding, and feedback handling. Experiments across 15,456 instances, 7 models, and 16 local tools reveal that while overall performance is high, robustness degrades significantly, especially under tool‑output/observation perturbations, and mixed‑family perturbations produce non‑additive failure patterns.
By YiShan Zheng, Yuan Wu, Yi Chang
The paper audits silent failures in agent-to-tool interactions within the ToolUniverse environment, focusing on 15 scientific tools. It identifies 91 failures—primarily missing data or inconsistent search/filtering—occurring mainly in the API and wrapper layers, and shows how these silent failures can propagate downstream into seemingly valid outputs. The authors propose contextual reliability and recommend testing, disclosure, monitoring, and measurement strategies for the agent-tool pipeline.
By Shreya Gopalan, Devansh Singh, Sundaraparipurnan Narayanan
arXiv:2607. 29254v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) with external tools, enabling them to perform complex tasks and translate model outputs into consequential real-world actions.
By Minghui Pan, Jiayuxuan Yang, Yuanyuan Yuan, Yu Jiang, Zhenpeng Chen
arXiv:2609.05587v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Existing evaluations of tool-using agents primarily measure whether an agent can successfully complete diverse tasks with tools. These evaluations gene...
By Hoyeol Yang, Woojung Song, Taewon Kim, Jonghyun Song, Seoyeon Park, Yohan Jo
Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly evaluated on their ability to use tools, plan multi-step tasks, coordinate with other agents, and operate over extended horizons. Reported benchmark gains often obscure recurring failure modes documented across otherwise unrelated evaluation efforts.
arXiv:2609.14758v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Tool-augmented language models are evaluated on whether they reach the right answer, not on whether they report honestly when a tool fails to supply...
By Arham Sethi, Arsen Kenzhebayev, Saanvi Paturi, Vatsal Raina, Vyas Raina, Ivaxi Sheth
arXiv:2607. 05775v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly evaluated on their ability to use tools, plan multi-step tasks, coordinate with other agents, and operate over extended horizons.
By Wael Albayaydh, Rui Zhao, Ivan Flechais
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.
By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang
The paper investigates how AI agents that run long workflows using external tools can experience inconsistencies when retries, speculative execution, concurrency, or partial failures occur. It introduces an effect‑history model that distinguishes between actual external events and the agent’s observations, and catalogs eight common external‑effect anomalies. The authors analyze the standard Model Context Protocol tool interface, finding that its annotations are too coarse to fully express the necessary capabilities to prevent these anomalies, thereby motivating the need for reusable transactional contracts at the agent‑tool boundary.
By Artem Trofimov, Boris Novikov