arXiv:2605. 06340v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Continuous post-deployment compliance audits, mandated by emerging regulations such as the EU AI Act and Digital Services Act, create a class of strategic gaming distinct from the one-shot input/output gaming studied in prior work.
arXiv:2608. 08577v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fraud operations must allocate events among automatic approval, analyst review, and automatic blocking even though the labels needed to evaluate these actions are selective and delayed.
arXiv:2608. 16852v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Regulatory compliance monitoring in deployed language models is increasingly implemented as a legal and audit control, checking model outputs against written rules spanning data protection, healthcare, financial regulation, and platform policy.
arXiv:2605. 07674v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Regulatory audits of AI systems increasingly rely on differential privacy (DP) to protect training data and model internals.
arXiv:2608. 15101v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Policy evaluation often estimates direct benefits and costs while treating the institutional environment as fixed.
arXiv:2606. 08791v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the problem of auditing a black-box algorithmic decision-maker from observable inputs and outputs alone.
arXiv:2606. 10241v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history.
arXiv:2606. 11417v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Compression progress is a long-standing proposal for intrinsic motivation: reward an agent when its world model becomes better at predicting or compressing experience.
arXiv:2607. 10814v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluating LLM agents in hidden-information multi-agent settings is hard: final outcomes are high-variance and rarely reveal why an agent decided as it did.
arXiv:2607. 13928v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whistleblowers are a key safeguard against organizational wrongdoing, but the threat of retaliation deters reporting.
arXiv:2608. 06362v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deciding which of two agents is stronger means playing games until skill outweighs luck, and every game costs money, model inference, or expert time.
arXiv:2607. 11653v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Black-box conditional quantile forecasts are widely used for sequential decisions under asymmetric costs, such as inventory planning in supply chain management.
arXiv:2608. 05490v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous agents now carry out entire data analyses, selecting cohorts, joining tables, and fitting models with little step-by-step supervision.