arXiv AI By Boning Li, Yu Chen, Longbo Huang

AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games

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arXiv:2608. 06362v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deciding which of two agents is stronger means playing games until skill outweighs luck, and every game costs money, model inference, or expert time.

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arXiv AI
Sep 18

Efficient Nash Equilibrium Computation for Cybersecurity Games

The paper introduces Regret-Weighted Payoff Sampling (RWPS), a budgeted estimator that selectively simulates only payoff-matrix cells relevant to a Nash equilibrium and uses a surrogate model for the remaining entries. RWPS provides an instance-dependent error bound weighted by the opponent’s equilibrium mixture and a coverage result guaranteeing that, once the deviation-relevant set is simulated, surrogate error does not affect either player’s regret. Experiments on three 21×21 general-sum games, including an asymmetric Colonel Blotto, show that RWPS achieves four to six times tighter bounds than previous methods and outperforms other sampling strategies on the CyGym and ANSG cyber simulators at low budgets.

By Michael Lanier, David Farmer, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik