arXiv:2607. 09306v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Behavioural auditing asks whether a language model behaves as it claims, but detection scores are reported without separating two targets: whether a reply was produced under a behaviour-inducing condition (exposure) and whether the behaviour surfaced in it (manifestation).
arXiv:2606. 15474v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Continuous evaluation of LLM products relies on a strong LLM judge treated as ground truth: a cheap monitor scores every interaction and a team is paged when the score drifts down.
arXiv:2608. 13329v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A model that behaves differently when it senses it is being tested would undermine the evaluations we rely on, so recent work has sought to read that sense directly from a model's activations.
arXiv:2607. 24054v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A correct answer can conceal why an agent succeeded.
arXiv:2607. 04419v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: When evaluator-derived step rewards are pooled or compared across scoring channels, their sign is treated as transportable.
arXiv:2607. 13346v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Alignment faking is dangerous because a model can appear compliant under monitoring while preserving behavior it would reveal when unmonitored.
arXiv:2606. 15420v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A constitution tells a language model what to value, but little tells us whether it does.
arXiv:2608. 16003v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Automated checking pipelines increasingly place one language model as the checker and another (or the same one) as the fixer.
arXiv:2606. 30449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Probes on model internals could help monitor agentic systems if they identify harmful text or tool actions before those actions are generated.
arXiv:2606. 09046v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Useful audits reveal not only how often a model fails, but also where its failures concentrate.
arXiv:2608. 09624v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Internal safety scores judge a prompt before any text is generated, and they are validated by how well they separate harmful prompts from benign ones.
arXiv:2607. 13075v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form.
Alignment faking is dangerous because a model can appear compliant under monitoring while preserving behavior it would reveal when unmonitored. When no scratchpad is visible, behavior alone cannot distinguish strategic from genuine compliance.