arXiv:2608. 13329v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A model that behaves differently when it senses it is being tested would undermine the evaluations we rely on, so recent work has sought to read that sense directly from a model's activations.
arXiv:2607. 11598v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: There are two standard ways to spend more compute at test time: let a model reason longer, or sample more attempts and keep one.
arXiv:2607. 03598v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When a person shares something with a language model, the model often answers the surface of the message rather than what the sender was doing by sending it: share a finished project and it critiques the code; share a raw late-night line and it runs a wellness check.
arXiv:2608. 04735v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is increasingly treated as an important safety layer for frontier reasoning models.
There are two standard ways to spend more compute at test time: let a model reason longer, or sample more attempts and keep one. Both share a hidden limit: they are internal.
arXiv:2606. 09046v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Useful audits reveal not only how often a model fails, but also where its failures concentrate.
arXiv:2606. 30449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Probes on model internals could help monitor agentic systems if they identify harmful text or tool actions before those actions are generated.
arXiv:2607. 08456v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A model should refuse two different things: answers it would get wrong, and questions it should not answer at all, such as unanswerable ones or ones resting on a false premise.
arXiv:2606. 20205v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Psychological instruments designed for humans are increasingly used to assign large language models (LLMs) stable psychological profiles that affect their usability, safety assessment, and use as proxies for human participants in research.
arXiv:2607. 09306v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Behavioural auditing asks whether a language model behaves as it claims, but detection scores are reported without separating two targets: whether a reply was produced under a behaviour-inducing condition (exposure) and whether the behaviour surfaced in it (manifestation).
arXiv:2605. 27752v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM confidence calibration is often evaluated by comparing two signals: token-probability scores and verbalized confidence.
arXiv:2608. 05224v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models fine-tuned on human behavioural data have emerged as general-purpose cognitive proxies, but the scale this requires, and whether these models process task structure or exploit statistical shortcuts, remain open questions.
arXiv:2606. 09843v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) give stable answers to personality questionnaires, yet these self-reports fail to predict how the models behave.