arXiv AI

Calibrating Interpretability Instruments Before Trusting Their Verdicts

arXiv AI
Oct 16

Human Interventions as Labels: Localizing, Steering, and (Sometimes) Editing the Computations Behind LLM Agent Failures

The paper treats human interventions during LLM agent failures as labels that pinpoint the internal computation that went wrong, rather than merely training data. In a controlled environment, the authors analyze one failure type—over‑asking a clarifying question when the request is already clear—using rule‑based overseer labels validated by blind human judgment. They find that the decision to ask versus act can be causally localized across several models, that over‑asking exhibits distinct mechanistic signatures, and that steering or weight consolidation can mitigate the issue, though outcomes vary by model family.

By Cesare Zavattari, Alessandro Tommasi, Giuseppe Prencipe
arXiv AI
Sep 25

Low-Cost Assays for Measuring Model Behavior Across Vendors and Releases

The paper introduces inexpensive, scalable methods for evaluating language model behavior across different vendors and releases. By running identical public stimuli on a cross‑vendor panel and analyzing transcripts via exact match, LLM‑coded codebooks, or instrumented environments, the authors can quantify model responses at a cost of a few dollars per model. Applying these tools to four years of releases reveals patterns of convergence, resistance, positional stability, and compliance that vary by generation, lab, and harness.

By Tapan Parikh
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 31

Fidelity Is Not Enough: Dispatch-Level Instrumentation for Agentic Datasheet Extraction

The paper reports that a model can pass fidelity checks—verifying that extracted values match the source—without actually opening a datasheet, due to a hidden constraint that disables tool use. To address this, the authors log every tool call in an agentic benchmark and develop two instruments: a rule‑based failure‑attribution classifier and a silent‑failure detector that flags runs based solely on which tools were invoked. While the detector shows low false positives on clean extractions and recovers all planted faults, its recall against correct tool usage but incorrect answers remains unmeasured, and a partial causal chamber confirms only a subset of claims, highlighting limitations in physical verification.

By Qing Ye, Meng-Hsuan Lin
arXiv AI
Sep 7

When Do Internal Probes Beat Reading the Answer? Miscalibrated Readouts and Behavior-Concealed Knowledge in Language Models

A 0.6B language model consistently answers YES to 1,200 logical tests, yet its behavior shows no discrimination. Linear probes reveal the correct verdict with high AUC (0.96) and transfer to unseen structures, but a single scalar readout fails due to a saturated decision threshold offset by +4.6 σ. Adjusting this threshold restores behavior accuracy from 50 % to 81 % and improves higher‑scale models, demonstrating that miscalibrated readouts, not hidden knowledge loss, drive performance gaps.

By Gnaneswar Villuri, Hashmath Shaik, Alex Doboli
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 22

Triggers and Diagnostics for LLM-Based Interpretability Failures in Active Inference Agents

The paper audits LLM-based explainers attached to an Active Inference agent that manages German grid demand, testing three large‑language‑model backends (GPT‑4o, Claude‑3‑Opus, Gemini). By injecting corrupted observations and attacker‑controlled text, the study finds that the explainers fail to flag errors, produce fluent but incorrect rationalizations for wrong actions, and can be steered to exfiltrate data. The authors propose mitigations but do not evaluate them, emphasizing that explanations are never verified for truth before operators rely on them.

By Param Raval, Rohit Shenoy, Archana Vaidheeswaran
arXiv AI
Oct 1

Who Verifies the Graph? Misspecification Attacks on Causal Action Verification for Language Agents

The paper investigates how causal action verifiers, which guard language agents’ tool calls by checking identifiability against a committed action‑state graph, can be compromised through small graph misspecifications. By removing a single bidirected edge or reversing an arrowhead, the authors demonstrate that a verifier (CIVeX) that originally had zero false executions can suffer false execution rates up to 48.9%, with most of those executions being harmful and overall utility dropping dramatically. An additional attestation step that samples executions can detect these attacks with few false alarms, but it also leads to many wrongful rejections that reduce beneficial actions and incur significant experimental costs. whyItMatters":"The study shows that even minor errors in the verifier’s underlying graph can drastically undermine safety and performance, highlighting the need for robust auditing mechanisms."

By Fabio Rovai