SENTINEL‑RL is an agentic SOC architecture that separates topological reasoning from semantic reasoning. It uses a heterogeneous graph attention encoder to compress a large authentication subgraph into a fixed‑dimensional state, a PPO policy to map that state to constrained investigative actions, and an LLM loop that only consumes policy recommendations and produces analyst‑readable narratives. Experiments on LANL and Indiana University datasets show fast graph ingestion, reliable alerting, high PPO performance, and a median 6.3‑second containment cycle.
BekchiAI introduces a benchmark and platform for evaluating large language model agents. The benchmark comprises 13 tool‑using ReAct agents across seven task categories, totaling 2,057 deterministic test tasks with verifier‑checkable gold answers. The platform offers web‑based observability, token and latency telemetry, and remote run termination for live agents.
arXiv:2610.09906v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security Operations Centers (SOCs) for information technology and operational technology share one incident-response problem: a flood of correlated a...
The paper introduces AOI (Autonomous Operations Intelligence), a multi‑agent framework that treats automated site reliability tasks as a structured trajectory learning problem under security constraints. It combines a trainable diagnostic system using Group Relative Policy Optimization, a read‑write separated execution architecture, and a Failure Trajectory Closed‑Loop Evolver that turns unsuccessful runs into corrective supervision. On the AIOpsLab benchmark, AOI achieves significant performance gains, including a 66.3% best@5 success rate and improved average metrics on unseen fault types.
ClawSentry is an open‑source, framework‑agnostic security supervision gateway designed to protect autonomous large language model (LLM) agents from progressive risks that can arise at four points in the agent control loop: skill admission, invocation‑time intent, execution‑time effect, and post‑action consequence. It introduces a multi‑tier decision engine—deterministic L1, rule‑anchored L2, and read‑only L3—alongside a First‑Use Skill Package Review (FSPR) and an Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) that applies a single policy across multiple agent runtimes without modifying their internals. Evaluation on SkillInject and the SkillsSafety benchmark shows that ClawSentry significantly reduces contextual adversarial skill risk (ASR) while maintaining high task success rates (TSR).
arXiv:2608. 05144v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Long-horizon reasoning requires an agentic runtime that can persist when evidence supports its current approach and pivot when measurements reveal failure, hidden constraints, or a misspecified objective.
arXiv:2609.24710v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in cybersecurity, where accurate analysis often requires multi-step and context-dependent reasonin...
arXiv:2608. 05144v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-horizon reasoning requires an agentic runtime that can persist when evidence supports its current approach and pivot when measurements reveal failure, hidden constraints, or a misspecified objective.
arXiv:2607. 26791v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities.
The paper introduces ALERT‑BENCH, a benchmark that simulates enterprise security telemetry and evaluates how large‑language‑model agents triage alerts. Five common reasoning strategies—single‑pass tool use, iterative retrieval, sampled investigations, self‑review, and explicit verification—were tested on 1,247 alerts from a multi‑stage attack scenario, each missing at least 40.4% of attack‑related alerts. Building on these findings, the authors propose AIDA, a multi‑agent framework that enforces explicit decision proposals, independent challenges, and stronger evidence requirements, achieving an F1 score of 0.958 and reducing false‑negative alerts from 40.4% to 3.1% while escalating 18.4% to analysts.
arXiv:2608.00677v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents operate in persistent environments where early state changes can influence decisions far into the future. Unlike conventional language-mo...
arXiv:2609.23894v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI extends LLM security beyond generated content to persistent state, autonomous actions, tool use, and interactions with humans and other ag...
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.