arXiv Computer Vision

No Way To Steal My Face: Proactive Defense Against Identity-Preserving Personalized Generation

arXiv Computer Vision
Oct 2

Anti-Persona: Disrupting Unauthorized Identity Binding and Recognition in Personalized Vision--Language Models

The paper introduces Anti-Persona, an image-level defense that prevents unauthorized identity binding and recognition in personalized vision–language models. By aggregating visual features from multiple reference images into an identity prototype and applying subtle perturbations, the method disrupts prototype alignment in the vision‑encoder space while maintaining visual fidelity. Experiments on two personalized LVLMs show protection rates up to 95.0% and robustness across prompt variations and encoder mismatches.

By Abhishek Basu, Fahad Shamshad, Karthik Nandakumar
arXiv Computer Vision
Oct 8

How Private is Private? A Comparative Study for Face De-Identification

The paper introduces a unified evaluation framework for face de-identification (FDeID), addressing inconsistencies in current protocols. It presents UtilFace, a demographically balanced benchmark assembled from four large-scale datasets, and HiFD, a hierarchical metric that simultaneously measures identity suppression, multi-level utility preservation, and image quality. Using this framework, the authors compare adversarial, GAN-based, and diffusion-based methods, revealing trade-offs and failure modes that were previously hidden, and they release the benchmark and toolkit for reproducible research.

By Hui Wei, Hao Yu, Hui Kuurila-Zhang, Guoying Zhao
arXiv Computer Vision
4d ago

KVeil: First-Place Solution to ECCV 2026 LifeGenIP Challenge on Unlearnable Videos

The paper presents KVeil, the first‑place solution to the ECCV 2026 LifeGenIP Challenge on Unlearnable Videos. It introduces Reference Capacity Collapse and a Motion‑Guided EOT mechanism for Phase 1, and a two‑layer framework that protects facial and background regions for Phase 2, achieving strong protection against various customization attacks. The methods build on the authors’ prior work LETHE and are publicly available on GitHub.

By Boheng Li, Yueming Xing, Yiming Li, Jie Zhang, Han Qiu, Tianwei Zhang