The paper introduces the concept of summarization bias in large language models (LLMs), describing a systematic tendency for LLMs to represent narrative meaning as an abstract summary label rather than the reconstructable inferential structure that produces it. It frames this bias within the Bulut Doctrine’s told‑shown axis, arguing that LLMs fail in a specific direction: they default to told‑mode explicitness in generative tasks and reward told‑mode explicitness while under‑detecting shown‑mode suppression in evaluative tasks. The authors outline two regimes of bias, present preliminary evidence, and pre‑register a test protocol to validate or abandon the construct.
arXiv:2608.21766v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Both capability and safety benchmarks rest upon the assumption that the behavior of language models undergoing a test is informative about their beha...
The paper argues that feature attribution scores for generative language models lack a fixed meaning because each generated token is both output and input, leading to multiple distinct explanatory questions. It introduces the Attribution Contract framework, which explicitly defines the model score, fixed variables, target output, generation process, and eligible features, showing how these choices affect attribution outcomes. Experiments demonstrate that different contracts (e.g., local next-token vs. prompt-level) and model architectures (mixture-of-experts vs. masked-diffusion) yield markedly different attribution distributions, highlighting the need for careful contract specification.
arXiv:2607. 01153v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, or misreported progress in an agentic task.
The study investigates bias in large language model (LLM) judges by having ten LLMs evaluate narrative constraint selections rather than generated text. Results show that self-preference largely disappears under blind evaluation when quality and evaluator severity are controlled, but self- and other-labels alone shift scores bidirectionally when quality is matched. The authors conclude that authorship attribution drives evaluation bias and that open-ended, ground‑truth‑free tasks can effectively study LLM judge behavior.
arXiv:2607. 22657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can reproduce disinformation-aligned narrative frames as plausible explanations, raising the question of whether existing machine-unlearning algorithms can suppress this behavior.
arXiv:2608. 11816v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: State-aligned distortion has been documented in China-origin text-based large language models (LLMs), but whether, and in what form, it arises in multimodal systems has not been systematically examined.
arXiv:2606. 29034v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly summarize clinical evidence, where a claim's weight depends on how strongly it is supported.
arXiv:2606. 20205v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Psychological instruments designed for humans are increasingly used to assign large language models (LLMs) stable psychological profiles that affect their usability, safety assessment, and use as proxies for human participants in research.
arXiv:2508.16013v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in politically sensitive contexts, raising concerns about their susceptibility to ideologica...
arXiv:2605. 22714v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models are routinely used as automated evaluators: to review code, moderate content, or score outputs, often with many items passing through one conversation.
arXiv:2609.08016v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent debate, in which several LLMs exchange arguments before answering, is widely assumed to improve answer quality by surfacing genuine disagre...
arXiv:2608. 14630v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Human decision-making is often shaped by a range of well-documented cognitive biases.