arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney
arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.
By Peizhi Niu, Wenjie Qu, Shangding Gu, Tianneng Shi, Yuankai Li, Ahmad Tawaha, Hend Alzahrani, Vincent Siu, Boyi Li, Chenguang Wang, Jiaheng Zhang, Basel Alomair, Ming Jin, Muhao Chen, Chi Wang, Costas Spanos, Dawn Song
arXiv:2603. 23171v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Providers monitor deployed large language models (LLMs) to detect misuse that they cannot prevent.
By Toluwani Aremu, Daniil Ognev, Samuele Poppi, Nils Lukas
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
By Harry Owiredu-Ashley
arXiv:2606. 15242v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse.
By Yi Xie, Jiawei Du, Yu Cheng, Jiuan Zhou, Zhaoxia Yin
arXiv:2608. 09732v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills are emerging as an important attack surface in LLM-based agent systems.
By Puyu Zeng, Simeng Qin, Jingzhi Li, Ju Jia, Zheli Liu, Xiaojun Jia
arXiv:2602. 06911v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks.
By Saad Hossain, Tom Tseng, Punya Syon Pandey, Samanvay Vajpayee, Matthew Kowal, Nayeema Nonta, Samuel Simko, Stephen Casper, Zhijing Jin, Kellin Pelrine, Sirisha Rambhatla
arXiv:2608. 06909v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate through long-horizon trajectories involving user instructions, tool use, external observations, and memory.
By Jing Chen, Yang Sun, Li Zhang, Lin Xu, Jie Shi
arXiv:2606. 26479v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent work (2024 to 2026) has converged on a strategy for defending tool-using LLM agents against indirect prompt injection: rather than training the model to refuse malicious instructions, enforce security outside the model with a deterministic policy that mediates the agent's actions.
By Praneeth Narisetty, Shiva Nagendra Babu Kore, Uday Kumar Reddy Kattamanchi, Jayaram Kumarapu
arXiv:2606. 00152v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users.
By Mingxuan Zhang, Jiahui Han, Dadi Guo, Songze Li, Guanchu Wang, Na Zou, Dongrui Liu, Xia Hu
arXiv:2607. 18063v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents process external content, exposing them to prompt injection and multi-turn manipulation.
By Devina Jain, David Hartmann, Chuan Li
arXiv:2606. 05252v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security teams routinely simulate attacks against their own systems to check whether their monitoring would catch a real intruder.
By Alexandre Cristov\~ao Maiorano