arXiv AI By Spencer King, Zhilu Zhang, Mikhail Kuznetsov, Kay Liu, Baris Coskun, Wei Ding

On the Effectiveness of Kernel-Level Evidence for Agent Security

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The paper introduces the Agent Cross‑Layer Evidence (ACE) corpus, pairing application‑level telemetry with kernel‑level syscall traces to study agent security. It shows that kernel evidence alone is discriminative and that combining it with application‑level data outperforms either layer alone, revealing complementary signals. The study also demonstrates that this cross‑layer approach generalizes to unseen attack families and works across different agent runtimes.

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