arXiv:2607. 19396v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Document-based LLM systems often flatten a PDF before guardrails inspect it.
arXiv:2608. 00144v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Membership inference (MIA) on language models is usually summarised by aggregate ROC-AUC, but such evaluations are confounded: model-free blind baselines can separate members from non-members using surface text alone.
arXiv:2607. 09290v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In the digital era, Portable Document Format (PDF) is one of the most widely used file formats for storing and exchanging digital documents due to its platform independence and rich functionality.
arXiv:2608. 00144v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Membership inference (MIA) on language models is usually summarised by an aggregate ROC-AUC, but such evaluations are confounded: model-free blind baselines separate members from non-members from surface text alone.
arXiv:2607. 02079v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present HaloGuard 1.
arXiv:2608. 02678v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning: an attacker who inserts a crafted document into the retrieval corpus can steer the underlying large language model (LLM) toward an attacker-chosen wrong answer.
arXiv:2606. 02959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Published evaluations of prompt-injection and jailbreak detectors for Large Language Models often suffer from two systematic weaknesses: per-dataset threshold tuning and undisclosed operating points.
arXiv:2606. 18530v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Domain-camouflaged injection attacks embed malicious instructions in retrieved content using domain-appropriate vocabulary, evading standard detectors that rely on syntactic injection markers.
arXiv:2608. 14639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Per-field accept/review with selective risk at most alpha -- accept a field only if the error rate among accepted fields is controlled -- is the trust contract document-extraction systems need, and the natural procedure silently violates it on real documents.
arXiv:2603. 19423v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks.
arXiv:2602. 14161v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Detecting prompt injection, jailbreak attacks, and harmful requests is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely, yet current evaluation practices in this literature overestimate generalization.
arXiv:2607. 26339v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence.
arXiv:2605. 00994v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning can significantly modify the behavior of large language models, including introducing harmful or unsafe behaviors.