This paper presents an LLM-based system that translates natural-language access control policies (NLACPs) into executable Rego code for Open Policy Agent (OPA). It provides a modular, end-to-end pipel...
arXiv:2607. 03656v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models are increasingly used to turn natural-language requirements into code.
By Adarsh Vatsa, Sachi Shome, Yingming Zhou, William Eiers
arXiv:2608. 16402v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model-based agentic frameworks primarily optimize capability: whether an agent can reason, retrieve information, call tools, delegate work, and complete a goal.
By Bhaskar Tripathi, Anurag Kumar, Ramendra Kumar, Bhavesh Gadhe
arXiv:2510. 20692v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Access control policies are reliability-critical configuration artifacts in cloud systems, yet administrators frequently struggle to verify that a policy permits exactly what they intend.
By Adarsh Vatsa, Bethel Hall, William Eiers
The paper introduces PACE, a Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement system designed to secure tool-using large language model agents by mediating every tool call before execution. PACE employs path confinement to limit influence paths and verifies effects against authenticated authority, distinguishing certified execution contracts from evaluated configurations. Experiments on eight agent‑security benchmarks show that the evaluated configuration reduces attack success in most cases while maintaining near‑native utility.
By Fengpeng Li, Qizhou Wang, Yuke Hu, Kemou Li, Jun Liu, Haiwei Wu, Jiantao Zhou, Di Wang
ActGov is a runtime enforcement framework that validates each action proposed by a large language model (LLM) agent before it interacts with external tools, ensuring that actions stay within task‑scoped authorization boundaries and comply with dynamically constructed policies. It builds policies from tool specifications, benign tasks, and failure traces, verifying updates via SMT‑based counterexample checking. In evaluations on AgentDojo and AgentDyn benchmarks, ActGov consistently reduces indirect prompt‑injection attack success while maintaining task utility, outperforming existing defenses.
By Kaiyuan Zhang, Yuke Peng, Ke Jiang, Yinqian Zhang
arXiv:2608. 14590v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform irreversible real-world actions, including database updates, API calls, file operations, and autonomous use of tools.
By Pierre Dantas, Lucas Cordeiro, Ehsan Nowroozi, Tihanyi Norbert
arXiv:2510. 20692v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Cloud computing is ubiquitous, with a growing number of services being hosted on the cloud every day.
By Adarsh Vatsa, Bethel Hall, William Eiers
arXiv:2606. 19464v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous agentic AI systems driven by Large Language Models (LLMs) introduce a new class of security, privacy, and compliance challenges: an agent that can invoke tools, manipulate data, install software, and coordinate with peer agents across organizational boundaries must be constrained not just by authentication and access control, but by the full structure of enterprise governance.
By Anupam Joshi, Tim Finin, Karuna Pande Joshi, Lalana Kagal
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly execute long-horizon workflows through external tools, allowing untrusted outputs to influence subsequent actions and exceed user authorization. Existing...
The paper introduces CONTINUITY, a framework that ensures secure composition of large language model (LLM) agent controls by using assume‑guarantee contracts and authenticated security contexts. It models each component with signed root grants, provenance commitments, and other mechanisms to carry security context across transitions, formalizing end‑to‑end consequence integrity. A reference verifier and fault‑injection suite demonstrate that the full configuration prevents harmful effects while completing all benign tasks and correctly escalating ambiguous cases.
By Chris Zheng, Geng Yang
Granite.Trust Policy Tools introduces a YAML-based Actionable Policy schema that specifies what content a generative AI model can or cannot produce, allowing exception-based governance. It also offers a synthetic data generation pipeline to create policy-aligned training data and a suite of tools for defining and enforcing these policies throughout the AI lifecycle. The tools and example policies are open source, enabling organizations to tailor safety policies to their specific risks and regulatory contexts.
By Nathalie Baracaldo, Nicolas Mello, Kush R. Varshney, Heiko Ludwig, Kate Soule, David Cox