arXiv:2607. 03656v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models are increasingly used to turn natural-language requirements into code.
arXiv:2608. 14590v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform irreversible real-world actions, including database updates, API calls, file operations, and autonomous use of tools.
arXiv:2606. 17164v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompting has become the primary interface between humans and generative AI, yet many natural language prompts remain fragile: roles, goals, constraints, and expected outputs are often buried in prose or left implicit.
arXiv:2608. 16402v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model-based agentic frameworks primarily optimize capability: whether an agent can reason, retrieve information, call tools, delegate work, and complete a goal.
arXiv:2606. 02965v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As large language models gain tool access and are deployed as autonomous agents capable of editing records, executing transactions, and modifying infrastructure, we still evaluate them based on the sole metric of task completion.
arXiv:2510. 20692v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Access control policies are reliability-critical configuration artifacts in cloud systems, yet administrators frequently struggle to verify that a policy permits exactly what they intend.
arXiv:2606. 29887v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In real-world applications, guardrails are often expected to identify unsafe user-model interactions according to application-specific safety policies, rather than relying on predefined risk taxonomies.
arXiv:2602. 12430v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The transition from monolithic language models to modular, skill-equipped agents marks a defining shift in how large language models (LLMs) are deployed in practice.
arXiv:2608. 17007v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent Skills can specify procedural and resource obligations for tool use, and language models instantiate them as concrete programs.
arXiv:2607. 25398v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language-model agents are increasingly deployed under standing instructions: a system prompt, a policy file, or a skills document is placed in context, and the agent is trusted to let it govern every action that follows.
arXiv:2606. 26649v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent safety in high-stakes domains requires formal policy enforcement, but most existing approaches either rely on probabilistic guardrails (fine-tuned classifiers, prompt-based steering) that offer no formal guarantees, or on hand-coded symbolic enforcement that does not scale to the breadth of real policy specifications.
arXiv:2607. 17883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Enterprises will not deploy AI agents they cannot trust, and the most-cited reason for distrust is hallucination: confident, fluent output that is simply not true.
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.