arXiv AI

EvolvAttack: Backdooring self Evolving VLM Agents

arXiv AI
Sep 24

Safeguarding LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Threats via Shadow Memory

The paper introduces ShadowMem, a defensive framework that protects large language model agents from long-horizon threats by maintaining a dedicated safety-focused memory. Inspired by the shadow stack concept, ShadowMem stores safety-critical context throughout an agent’s execution and uses this shadow memory to evaluate the risk of upcoming actions before they are carried out. Experiments show that ShadowMem outperforms existing defenses in detection accuracy, detects most attacks early, and adds minimal overhead to agent performance.

By Yuhui Wang, Tanqiu Jiang, Jiacheng Liang, Charles Fleming, Ting Wang
arXiv AI
Jul 29

Architectural Backdoors in Vision-Language Model Supply Chains via Representation Steering

arXiv:2607. 25479v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision--Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed through a model supply chain in which pretrained checkpoints, architecture definitions, text encoders, and exported computation graphs are distributed by third parties and reused across downstream services.

By Maria Rosaria Briglia, Igor Maljkovic, Antonio Emanuele Cin\`a, Luca Oneto, Iacopo Masi, Fabio Roli
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 10

TrojanWorld: Backdooring World-Model Agents via Imagination Steering

TrojanWorld is a backdoor framework that targets world-model agents by steering their internal imagination toward attacker-specified actions when a physical trigger is present. The attack uses Decision-Reflective Induction, Clean Behavior Anchoring, and Causal Propagation to maintain stealth, persistence, and high performance. Experiments on TD-MPC2, DreamerV3, and R2-Dreamer across several benchmarks show that the attack can induce target actions with minimal performance loss and can keep agents on a malicious trajectory even after the trigger is removed.

By Wenkai Huang, Siyuan Liang, Gaolei Li, Yiming Li, Tianhao Peng, Jianhua Li, Dacheng Tao
arXiv AI
Jun 8

EVA: Evolving Semantic Adversaries for Red-Teaming GUI Agents Against Environmental Injection Attacks

arXiv:2505. 14289v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents powered by Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed yet vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs).

By Yijie Lu, Manman Zhao, Tianjie Ju, Zihe Yan, Xinbei Ma, Yuan Guo, Daizong Ding, Gongshen Liu, Zhuosheng Zhang