arXiv:2608. 12444v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An unconditional risk bound on automated decisions can be satisfied without automating anything, since a selector that never acts drives the bound to zero.
arXiv:2606. 00448v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on community-contributed skills that expand an agent's operational capability set.
The paper introduces a distribution‑free certification layer that can be applied to any crash‑severity prediction model without modifying the model itself. It provides guarantees for ordinal outcomes, per‑class validity, transfer of coverage to unobserved severities, and one‑sided certificates under deployment shift, all grounded in a functional of the true data law. The framework is evaluated on 5.2 million Texas records, demonstrating a model‑independent lower bound on set width for vulnerable road users and is released as an open‑source package with theorem‑level tests.
arXiv:2607. 05842v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-assisted software security operates at a difficult boundary: the vulnerability-analysis terminology needed for legitimate code review, triage, and repair can closely resemble terminology associated with misuse.
arXiv:2607. 22926v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: High-impact generative AI makes catastrophic misuse a lifecycle-control problem, not merely a prompt-filtering problem.
arXiv:2606. 05396v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Producing a labeled vulnerable code at scale is a recurring obstacle for learning-based vulnerability detection: mined corpora carry substantial label noise, and existing LLM-based augmentation propagates these inaccuracies because it transforms vulnerable seeds rather than synthesising vulnerabilities from a specification.
arXiv:2607. 02714v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: There is no doubt that safety alignment is an essential step in LLM training.
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
arXiv:2609.06036v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Proposal-based controllers---learned policies, language-model planners, and other black-box \emph{generators}---are increasingly deployed behind runtim...
arXiv:2606. 29654v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent deliberation among LLMs can improve reasoning, but deployment requires deciding when the current answer is reliable enough to act on and when it should be escalated to human review.
arXiv:2606. 08539v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly take consequential actions -- shell commands, cloud operations, and arbitrary tool-calls -- so a trust layer must decide, per action, whether to allow, warn, block, or escalate.
The paper introduces a claim‑safe protocol for evaluating closed‑loop AI systems, consisting of three actions: Refuse, Decompose, and Refresh. It demonstrates the protocol in a simulator with 24 policy components and 1,440 held‑out cases, showing that abstention and stable false admission rates are low while providing detailed statistical diagnostics. The approach emphasizes that evaluation results should be tied to observable support and statistical calibration rather than a single PASS/FAIL label.
arXiv:2606. 31023v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Hard-constrained sequential decision systems have no certified way to spend the test-time compute of modern AI: executing the multi-step drafts of a learned policy or a frozen LLM forfeits the feasibility guarantee a trusted solver provides, while invoking the solver at every step forfeits the speed the AI offers.