arXiv:2607. 05842v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-assisted software security operates at a difficult boundary: the vulnerability-analysis terminology needed for legitimate code review, triage, and repair can closely resemble terminology associated with misuse.
arXiv:2606. 31639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are no longer only text generators.
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.
arXiv:2606. 31159v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming software development, yet their use in security-critical contexts raises a key question: do models know when their generated code is insecure?
arXiv:2606. 05396v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Producing a labeled vulnerable code at scale is a recurring obstacle for learning-based vulnerability detection: mined corpora carry substantial label noise, and existing LLM-based augmentation propagates these inaccuracies because it transforms vulnerable seeds rather than synthesising vulnerabilities from a specification.
arXiv:2510. 15476v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as interfaces to information, code, and real-world services, making prompt-level security failures a practical concern.
arXiv:2608. 10530v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have undergone a shift from stateless conversational interfaces to autonomous agents capable of multi-step planning, tool invocation, code execution, and maintaining persistent memory.
arXiv:2607. 02714v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: There is no doubt that safety alignment is an essential step in LLM training.
arXiv:2606. 25750v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy.
arXiv:2512. 18542v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI coding assistants produce vulnerable code in 45\% of security-relevant scenarios~\cite{veracode2025}, yet no public training dataset teaches both traditional web security and AI/ML-specific defenses in a format suitable for instruction tuning.
arXiv:2607. 19449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited.
arXiv:2606. 04739v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong potential for automated software vulnerability detection, particularly in retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings.
Software vulnerability remediation is a cognitively demanding task that requires specialized security expertise often lacking in general developers. In the meantime, Large Language Models (LLMs) assisted tools show potential in vulnerability detection, location, and repair tasks.