arXiv AI By Cong Ming, Jingyi Chen, Bin Liu, Qi Chu, Tao Gong, Nenghai Yu, Yingfei Xiang

Yesterday's Shield, Today's Spear: A Self-Evolving Safety Guardrail in Production

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arXiv:2608. 08471v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deployed LLM safety guardrails are predominantly static: trained once and frozen at release, while new jailbreak techniques and previously un-addressed harmful categories emerge within days, leaving the defense perpetually a step behind.

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From Risk Classification to Action Plan Remediation: A Guardrail Feedback Driven Framework for LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 05805v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based guardrails typically safeguard agents by evaluating proposed actions or inputs before execution, producing safety signals such as binary allow/deny decisions, risk categories, and/or explanatory rationales about potential policy violations.

By Yuhao Sun, Jiacheng Zhang, Shaanan Cohney, Zhexin Zhang, Feng Liu, Xingliang Yuan
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DreamGuard: Efficient Runtime Guardrail for LLM Agents via Risk-Aware World Model

arXiv:2608. 05695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly invoke external tools and interact with real-world systems, unsafe actions may cause irreversible consequences on external states, user data, and downstream services.

By Wenhao Lin, Chenyu Yu, Xingwei Lin, Sicong Cao, Xiang Chen, Lei Xue, Le Yu, Letian Sha, Chunming Wu
arXiv AI
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ADVERSA: Measuring Multi-Turn Guardrail Degradation and Judge Reliability in Large Language Models

The paper introduces ADVERSA, an automated red‑teaming framework that evaluates large language model safety over multiple turns by tracking continuous compliance trajectories instead of binary jailbreak outcomes. Using a fine‑tuned 70B attacker model and a structured 5‑point rubric, the authors conduct controlled experiments on three frontier victim models, measuring guardrail degradation and judge reliability through a triple‑judge consensus. Results show a 26.7% jailbreak rate with most breaches occurring early, and the study documents inter‑judge agreement, attacker drift, and attacker refusals as key factors affecting safety assessment.

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