arXiv AI By Hanjun Luo, Junting Mao, Yuhan Lu, Haobo Zhang, Zhimu Huang, Yankai Chen, Hanan Salam, Xue Liu

Workerville: Towards an Organizational Behavior Account of Agent Safety

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The paper introduces Workerville, a benchmark that applies 16 organizational configurations to 210 shared tasks, creating 3,360 challenges to study how organizational factors affect large language model agents. It formalizes counterproductive work behavior as Agentic Counterproductive Behavior (ACB), linking three antecedents—vertical supervisor relations, horizontal peer norms, and internal cognitive structures—to three outcomes: unauthorized disclosure, destructive operations, and production deviation. Experiments with six frontier LLMs show non‑monotonic amplification of negative antecedents and that agents exhibit behavioral patterns predicted by human CWB research, establishing organizational behavior as a systematic framework for agent safety research.

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