The paper introduces the Agentic Adoption Index (AAI), a new measure of delegated exposure that captures whether workers actually commit tasks to AI within structured workflows. Using semantic embeddings of 888,000 agent skill specifications from GitHub and 18,000 O*NET task statements, the authors find that occupations with high delegation differ from those most vulnerable to pre-AI automation, that AAI correlates more with technical capability than with current LLM use, and that for lower‑educated occupations AAI rises with wages while it falls for higher‑educated, high‑earning workers. These patterns also appear in an independent corpus from the Manus Skills Marketplace.
By Hyeongjae Lee, Jihyang Cheon, Lanu Kim
The paper introduces the Agentic Adoption Index (AAI), a new metric that captures whether workers actually delegate tasks to AI within their workflows, rather than merely measuring potential AI applicability. Using 53,000 agent skill specifications and 18,000 O*NET task statements, the authors find that occupations with high delegation differ from those previously deemed most at risk, that AAI aligns more closely with AI’s capabilities than current usage, and that adoption peaks at mid‑wage, bachelor’s‑level occupations while declining at both ends of the wage and education spectrum. The study highlights that technical availability explains much of the variation, but other factors—such as resistance to specification or professional discretion—also influence who adopts AI.
whyItMatters":"The findings suggest that actual AI adoption patterns differ from prior risk assessments, indicating that factors beyond technical feasibility shape who delegates to AI, which has implications for workforce planning and policy."
By Hyeongjae Lee, Jihyang Cheon, Lanu Kim
arXiv:2606. 00448v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on community-contributed skills that expand an agent's operational capability set.
By Su Wang, Pin Qian, Yihang Chen, Junxian You, Xiaoyuan Wang, Xiaochong Jiang, Lifei Liu, Haoran Yu, Jingzhou Xu
arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
By Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci
arXiv:2607. 01421v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Engineering management research has produced mature frameworks for software risk: ownership by feature, escalation by severity, and assurance by test coverage.
By Laxmipriya Ganesh Iyer
Engineering management research has produced mature frameworks for software risk: ownership by feature, escalation by severity, and assurance by test coverage. These frameworks implicitly assume deterministic behavior, discrete and auditable change events, and clear component-to-owner mappings.
arXiv:2606. 15485v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI systems act autonomously, use tools, adapt to context, and operate in complex real-world environments.
By Hao-Ping Lee, Jessica He, David Piorkowski, Thomas Serban von Davier, Jodi Forlizzi, Sauvik Das
arXiv:2607. 28802v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing evaluations often reduce agent failures to system-level outcomes, obscuring where the fault originated and which intervention would improve the agent system.
By Harsh Raj, Vipul Gupta, Anas Mahmoud, Razvan-Gabriel Dumitru, Darvin Yi, Aakash Sabharwal, Yunzhong He
LLM-based agents leverage third-party skills to extend their capabilities in open-world scenarios. However, third-party skills can introduce extra security vulnerabilities, as seemingly harmless skills can contain latent safety risks that only emerge during actual execution.
arXiv:2608. 04018v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are increasingly embedded in organizational workflows, where they interact with external information sources and invoke digital tools to perform operational tasks.
By Zhihao Zhu, Yi Yang
arXiv:2605.12015v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Reusable skills are becoming a common interface for extending large language model agents, packaging procedural guidance with access to files...
By Chang Jin, An Wang, Zeming Wei, Kai Wang, Biaojie Zeng, Qiaosheng Zhang, Chao Yang, Jingjing Qu, Xia Hu, Xingcheng Xu
The paper introduces a black-box framework for evaluating agentic AI systems, focusing on multi-step vulnerabilities that standard single-turn tests miss. It presents a seven-domain taxonomy linking observable behaviors to risk categories, an automated SAGE-RT red-teaming process generating 120 adversarial scenarios per domain, and a human-validated evaluation using LLM judges. Empirical tests on CrewAI and AutoGen agents show significant governance, privacy, and behavior risks, demonstrating the framework’s ability to uncover critical architectural weaknesses without privileged access.
By Divyanshu Kumar, Nitin Aravind Birur, Tanay Baswa, Sahil Agarwal, Prashanth Harshangi