arXiv:2602.03100v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that operate in real-world environments, introducing safety risks beyond linguisti...
By Jingnan Zheng, Yanzhen Luo, Jingjun Xu, Bingnan Liu, Yuxin Chen, Chenhang Cui, Gelei Deng, Chaochao Lu, Xiang Wang, An Zhang, Tat-Seng Chua
arXiv:2606.00341v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: As AI agents are increasingly deployed in real personal and corporate settings (email accounts, development workflows, company databases, etc...
By Jeremy Tien, Abishek Anand, Yu-Rou Tuan, Yuchen Shen, J. Zico Kolter, Aran Nayebi
arXiv:2609.06783v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: LLM agents operate in workflows where unsafe actions can have real consequences. Existing safety evaluations often reduce behavior to a single score,...
By Ruoxi Shang, Christina-Maria Androna, Orfeas Menis Mastromichalakis, Yu Feng, Aniruddhan Ramesh, Rico Angell, Shang Hong Sim, Chrysoula Zerva, Emmanouil Koukoumidis
arXiv:2610.35188v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language models increasingly act through code, modifying repositories, executing programs, and interacting with services in agent form. Their a...
By Weitao Feng, Hengheng Xiong, Zihao Zeng, Jun Chen, Jiyang Guan, Xiaofeng Wang, Jialing Tao, Hui Xue, Wei Dong
The paper investigates whether tool‑calling large language model agents maintain consistent safety throughout a conversation. It finds that agents are most vulnerable at the very start of a session, with safety improving significantly after completing a few regular agentic tasks—a phenomenon termed the cold‑start safety gap. The authors introduce the Safety Over Depth for Agents (SODA) benchmark to systematically study this effect, evaluate multiple models, and demonstrate that warming up agents with regular tasks before deployment enhances safety while preserving utility.
By Chung-En Sun, Linbo Liu, Tsui-Wei Weng
arXiv:2610.17685v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Enterprise agents face safety risks that cannot be determined from individual actions alone. Existing safety benchmarks largely evaluate action-local...
By Jingyue Cong, Estrid He, Zhuang Li, Nan Wu, Li Shen, Yameng Peng, Xinshu Li, Andy Song
arXiv:2606. 02965v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all.
By Victor Ojewale, Suresh Venkatasubramanian
arXiv:2606. 00341v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI agents are increasingly deployed in real personal and corporate settings (email accounts, development workflows, company databases, etc.
By Jeremy Tien, Abishek Anand, Yu-Rou Tuan, Yuchen Shen, J. Zico Kolter, Aran Nayebi
arXiv:2608. 08601v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: To anticipate socio-technical risks from AI agents, organizations need taxonomies to classify them.
By Gabriele La Malfa, Lakmal Meegahapola, Edyta Bogucka, Jie M. Zhang, Michael Luck, Elizabeth Black, Daniele Quercia
arXiv:2609.39050v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As multi-agent systems enter high-stakes domains, the possibility that agents may circumvent safety boundaries is a growing concern. Prior work has e...
By Deema Alnuhait, Gengyu Wang, Muhammad Khalifa, Hao Peng
Guard models are used to prevent LLM agents from performing forbidden actions, but this alone does not guarantee safety. The paper shows that many agent trajectories contain unfulfilled safety‑critical obligations—actions that should have been performed—highlighting a new source of risk. To address this, the authors introduce ObligationBench, a benchmark of 240 expert‑validated trajectories, and develop ObligationGuard, a model that improves obligation detection recall and exact‑match rates over existing models.
By Youwei Feng, Yitong Zhang, Yuetong Liu, Jia Li
LatentRiskBench is a new benchmark designed to evaluate state-dependent safety risks in enterprise agents, where the safety of an action depends on the workflow state rather than the action alone. It pairs risky trajectories with benign ones that share the same terminal action but differ in latent policy-relevant states, forcing models to reconstruct context instead of relying on action cues. The benchmark introduces residual risk metrics and demonstrates that state-level evaluation detects 96% of violations compared to only 9% for action-level methods, highlighting the inadequacy of existing guardrails.