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arXiv:2606. 11265v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate downstream model outputs through malicious knowledge injection.
arXiv:2606. 02643v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-enhanced LLM systems, while powerful, introduce substantial inference costs due to the inclusion of an extra multi-stage pipeline that dynamically retrieves and synthesizes information from external knowledge sources.
arXiv:2603. 00801v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language agents increasingly act as web-enabled systems that search, browse, and synthesize information from diverse sources.
RAGSentinel is a training‑free, label‑free defense designed for black‑box retrieval‑augmented generation systems. It employs a surrogate encoder to detect hidden‑state shifts caused by retrieved documents, removes shared topic directions, and filters poisoned documents as geometric outliers from a robust majority consensus. The method is proven to recover a poison‑free majority context under honest‑majority and representation‑separation assumptions, and experiments show it keeps attack success rates low while maintaining accuracy across multiple datasets, LLM families, and adaptive attacks.
arXiv:2510. 06732v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as rerankers in information retrieval, yet their ranking behavior can be steered by small, natural-sounding prompts.
Multimodal Retrieval Augmented Generation (M-RAG) is increasingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks where malicious data are crafted to produce embeddings that align with benign entries in the vector...