Hugging Face Trending Papers
DSPrompt: Dynamic Soft Prompt Defense Against M-RAG Corruption
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arXiv:2606. 11265v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate downstream model outputs through malicious knowledge injection.
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Jun 11
ProGRank: Probe-Gradient Reranking to Defend Dense-Retriever RAG from Corpus Poisoning
arXiv:2603. 22934v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves large language model applications by grounding generation in retrieved evidence, but also introduces corpus poisoning as a new attack surface.
arXiv AI
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Walking the Embedding Space: Datastore Extraction from Multimodal RAG
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arXiv AI
Jun 3
Inference Cost Attacks for Retrieval-Augmented Large Language Models
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arXiv Computation and Language
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arXiv AI
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Zero-Shot Embedding Drift Detection: A Lightweight Defense Against Prompt Injections in LLMs
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