arXiv AI

AgentXploit: Autonomous Repository-to-Runtime Red-Teaming for AI Agents

AgentXploit is a two‑role auditing system that separates repository‑level attack‑path discovery from runtime exploitation for AI agents. The Analyzer Agent traces attacker‑controlled inputs to sensitive operations and records candidate attack paths, while the Exploiter Agent turns these paths into concrete attacks and refines them using runtime feedback. The system is evaluated on AgentXploit‑Bench, a benchmark of 72 reproducible vulnerabilities across 12 open‑source AI‑agent systems, achieving 59.3% end‑to‑end success compared to 38.4% for Codex, and 79.2% attack success on AgentDojo versus 52.7% for AgentVigil.

arXiv AI
Jun 12

PI-Hunter: Automated Red-Teaming for Exposing and Localizing Prompt Injections

arXiv:2606. 12737v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into agentic systems that interact with external tools and environments, introducing new security risks such as indirect prompt injection attacks through untrusted external sources.

By Pengfei He, Lesly Miculicich, Vishesh Sharma, Ash Fox, George Lee, Jiliang Tang, Tomas Pfister, Long T. Le
arXiv AI
Jun 2

AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations

arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.

By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney
arXiv AI
Sep 4

A Blind Trust, the Bloody Thrust: When Attacker-Controlled Hook Updates Steer AI Agent Harnesses towards Malicious Behaviors

The paper reports a new attack surface in AI agent harnesses: lifecycle hooks that bind shell commands to runtime events. By updating only the hook configuration, an attacker can silently inject malicious commands into a benign plugin, enabling host‑side attacks such as privilege escalation. The authors present HookPry, an automated framework that demonstrates this vulnerability across 25 harness‑backend combinations, compromising all evaluated harnesses with high success rates.

By Pengxun Li, Litian Zhang, Jianwei Hou, Shujiang Wu, Song Li, Zifeng Kang, Xi Zhang