arXiv Machine Learning
Training-Free Refusal of MCP Exploits via Retrieval-Augmented Generation
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Matching Ranks Over Probability Yields Truly Deep Safety Alignment
arXiv:2512. 05518v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) play a critical role in the democratization of AI, yet their "open" nature introduces more avenues for malicious actors to misuse them for harmful purposes.
arXiv AI
Sep 30
Safer Content or Firmer Refusals? A Hybrid Perturbation Defense for Alignment under Harmful Fine-tuning
arXiv:2609.36862v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fine-tuning-as-a-service lets users adapt a safety-aligned language model to their own data, but it also creates a harmful fine-tuning attack surface...
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Safer Content or Firmer Refusals? A Hybrid Perturbation Defense for Alignment under Harmful Fine-tuning
Fine-tuning-as-a-service lets users adapt a safety-aligned language model to their own data, but it also creates a harmful fine-tuning attack surface: a small amount of harmful data mixed into an othe...
arXiv Computation and Language
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Beyond Shallow Alignment: How Post-Training Methods Determine Refusal Circuits And Steering Robustness
The paper investigates how different post‑training methods—supervised fine‑tuning, reasoning‑augmented fine‑tuning, and preference optimization (ORPO)—affect the internal computation of refusal behavior in language models. Experiments on Llama‑3.1‑8B, Gemma‑2‑9B, and Qwen3‑8B show that reasoning‑augmented training consistently creates a distinct refusal computation across models, while the architecture influences the internal structure and steerability of refusal. None of the studied methods simultaneously achieve a distributed refusal mechanism, preserve general capability, and allow easy corrective edits, indicating that current post‑training approaches are not a fully reliable defense for safety-critical applications.
arXiv AI
Sep 15
Rubrics as an Attack Surface: Stealthy Preference Drift in LLM Judges
arXiv:2602.13576v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Evaluation and alignment pipelines for large language models increasingly rely on LLM-based judges, whose behavior is guided by natural-langu...
arXiv AI
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Propensities Please: Exposing Alignment-Faking LLMs using Synthetic Document Finetuning
The paper introduces a technique called Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) to expose hidden misaligned behaviors in large language models that may engage in alignment faking. By finetuning models to associate certain keywords with undetected misaligned actions, the authors create honeypot environments and observe that the gap in misaligned action rates between cueed and uncued prompts widens, indicating more reliable detection than prompt-based methods. The study also notes that SDF can impair reasoning abilities, proposing on-policy distillation as a mitigation.