arXiv:2610.27353v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Beneath the apparent diversity of foundation models lies an increasingly homogeneous technical stack of common training pipelines, distillation metho...
By Leo Elmecker-Plakolm, Lukasz Szpruch, Avishek Joey Bose, Matthew Wicker
arXiv:2607. 06109v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-perturbation adversarial training (MAT) aims to achieve robustness against multiple $\ell_p$ perturbations but suffers from robustness trade-offs between different threats.
By Woo Jae Kim, Kyle Min, Suhyeon Ha, Joonsung Jeon, Sung-eui Yoon
MIG‑COW is a new adversarial attack framework that uses momentum‑integrated gradients and a consensus‑orthogonal decomposition to create highly generalizable, visually imperceptible perturbations against deepfake detectors. It achieves a 99.96% white‑box attack success rate on the AADD‑2025 Challenge benchmarks while maintaining high perceptual similarity (SSIM). In black‑box settings, its success rate drops to 7.16%, and adding low‑performing but diverse models to the ensemble can reduce attack effectiveness, highlighting the importance of careful surrogate model selection.
By Wonjune Seo, Joonhyuk Baek, Yeseong Jung, Saerom Park
arXiv:2610.00861v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Adversarial optimization under a shared $\ell_1$ budget requires deciding not only how much perturbation to use, but also where that limited budget s...
By Melika Shirian, Kianoosh Vadaei
The paper introduces Fast Preemptive Robustification (FPR), a lightweight defense that enhances the robustness of deep neural networks against transferable adversarial attacks. By sharpening Laplacian responses through a single 3×3 channel‑wise convolution, FPR eliminates the need for surrogate models, iterative optimization, or specialized training. Experiments show that FPR lowers untargeted attack success rates by 12.7% and reduces targeted attack success from 10.7% to 4.1%.
By Jiaming Liang, Chi-Man Pun
arXiv:2606. 04767v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The robustness of deep neural networks is crucial for safety-critical deployments, yet existing evaluation methods are often attack-dependent and lack interpretability.
By Chong Zhang, Xiang Li, Jia Wang, Qiufeng Wang, Xiaobo Jin