The paper introduces Fast Preemptive Robustification (FPR), a lightweight defense that enhances the robustness of deep neural networks against transferable adversarial attacks. By sharpening Laplacian responses through a single 3×3 channel‑wise convolution, FPR eliminates the need for surrogate models, iterative optimization, or specialized training. Experiments show that FPR lowers untargeted attack success rates by 12.7% and reduces targeted attack success from 10.7% to 4.1%.
arXiv:2511. 13749v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which are small, carefully crafted inputs that lead to incorrect predictions.
arXiv:2606. 01746v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern neural networks are highly susceptible to adversarial perturbations.
arXiv:2607. 04145v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Adversarial attacks guide and provide additional training and test data for both adversarial training and adversarial robustness validation, and expose the 'piecewise linearity' of deep learning based models.
arXiv:2606. 02267v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples poses a significant challenge for real-world deployment.
arXiv:2606. 01437v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are highly susceptible to adversarial perturbations, leading to extensive research on robustness for safety-critical applications.
arXiv:2505. 03646v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Adversarial robustness of deep autoencoders (AEs) has received less attention than that of discriminative models, although their compressed latent representations induce ill-conditioned mappings that can amplify small input perturbations and destabilize reconstructions.
arXiv:2606. 27784v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The existence of adversarial attacks is often attributed to the presence of non-robust features in neural networks.
arXiv:2606. 00738v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial Training (AT) is a leading defense against adversarial examples but often suffers from Catastrophic Overfitting (CO) in efficient single-step variants, where robustness to multi-step attacks collapses despite high single-step performance.
arXiv:2606. 04317v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deep neural networks are increasingly deployed across heterogeneous and partially untrusted environments, where models are distributed through cloud storage, CI/CD pipelines, containerized services, and edge execution platforms.
arXiv:2601. 14300v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Hard-label black-box attacks, relying solely on top-1 predictions, represent one of the most challenging yet practically threat models.
The paper reviews one‑pixel attacks (OPAs), highlighting their extreme adversarial fragility across domains such as medical diagnosis, autonomous driving, biometrics, and quantum communication. It presents a PRISMA‑guided synthesis of studies from 2017 to 2026, offering a unified taxonomy that covers algorithmic foundations, black‑box evolutionary optimization, hybrid and program‑synthesis attacks, defence mechanisms, interpretability tools, and domain‑specific vulnerabilities. The review identifies dominant Differential Evolution strategies, emerging efficiency‑optimized and saliency‑guided methods, and gaps in dataset diversity, transferability, and evaluation standards, while proposing future research directions and a regulatory framework for robustness testing and AI security governance.
The paper introduces SEAL, a training-time, parameter‑efficient defense that attaches a plug‑and‑play adapter to the shared expert component of Mixture‑of‑Experts models, and SEAL++, which adds an orthogonal constraint to preserve existing safety subspaces. By leveraging the always‑activated shared expert, SEAL mitigates the structural vulnerability of sparse routing to adversarial manipulation, reducing attack success rates by up to 60% with minimal impact on model capability. The approach is evaluated across six attack scenarios involving harmful prompting, jailbreaks, malicious fine‑tuning, and neuron pruning.